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Colloquy 
on 
Complex Litigation 
It has been ten years since Benjamin Kaplan, past reporter 
to the Advisory Committee on Federal Civil Rules, suggested 
that "the drive toward a unitary procedure be abated" and that 
"special procedures be set up that are better accomodated to the 
intrinsic qualities of problems presented."' 
Professor Kaplan's suggestions are representative of a 
movement in the profession toward specialized treatment of 
complex cases-a movement whose impact is considerable, as 
evidenced by the Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litiga- 
tion. Nonetheless, identifying the "intrinsic qualities of 
problems presented'' and fashioning procedures to respond to 
these problems are tasks that remain with us. 
In an effort to address these tasks, four distinguished schol- 
ars-one judge and three lawyers-met at J. Reuben Clark Law 
School. They discussed problems presented by complex litiga- 
tion. They examined causes of the problems and explored solu- 
tions. What follows is an edited transcript of their discussion. 
Participants: 
Alvin B. Rubin, Judge, United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 
Francis R. Kirkham; Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro. A.B., 1930, 
LL.B., 1931, George Washington University. 
Weyman I. Lundquist; Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe. 
A.B., 1952, Dartmouth College; LL.B., 1955, 
Harvard University. 
1. Kaplan, An American Lawyer in the Queen's Courts: Impressions of English 
Court Procedure, 69 MICH. L. REV. 821, 845 (1971). 
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Jerrold E. Salzman; Freeman, Rothe, Freeman & Salzman. 
A.B., 1962, University of Michigan; 
J.D., 1965, Harvard University. 
Kirkham: 
Salzman: 
Lundquist : 
Rubin: 
Kirkham: 
Salzman: 
In order for us to establish a common foundation, I 
think that the first question we ought to examine 
is, What is a complex case? 
A complex case is most often defined by the inertia 
of the parties and the court. 
That would be my first observation. One cannot 
identify a complex case by its subject matter or by 
the court that it is in. We have talked in Washing- 
ton about identifying a complex case, either by in- 
stinct or by use of Justice Department statistics. 
We have been able to adduce no guidelines that re- 
veal what a complex case is, except for a notion 
that lawyers involved in antitrust think antitrust 
cases are complicated-a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
I think we have two overlapping concepts. First, the 
complex case: cases that have complicated subject 
matter. Rule lob-5 cases with issues of scienter and 
reliance, patent cases with numerous defenses and 
claims, and certain antitrust cases are complex by 
virtue of the subject matter. They are just hard to 
understand. Second, the protracted case. The sub- 
ject matter may not be particularly complicated, 
but the case involves a lot of parties, or the amount 
at stake is very large, and the case goes on a long 
time. Sometimes the two overlap, resulting in a 
complex, protracted case. I don't find it very useful 
to distinguish the complex case from the protracted 
case. Viewing them as a single class-the difficult 
case-is a simpler concept. 
I agree with Judge Rubin. There are complex cases, 
and these cases require special treatment. They 
should be designated as complex and treated as 
complex from the outset. 
I agree that to avoid problems, certain cases should 
get special treatment. However, I am not certain 
that such treatment is required by the nature of 
the case. For example, the most complicated cases 
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that we see in our office are roof collapse cases. 
They present engineering problems, architectural 
problems, and use problems. There are many par- 
ties-steel manufacturers, the fabricator, the con- 
tractor, the subcontractor, etc. This list assumes 
that no one was killed or injured when the roof col- 
lapsed. We do, however, have to face all issues aris- 
ing out of the interruption of an ongoing business. 
These cases are very complex. However, the bar 
that handles them, for historical or other reasons, 
doesn't act like the antitrust bar. The cases get 
treated in an expeditious manner-both by the 
lawyers and the parties. I have found that although 
the roof collapse case is much more complicated 
than the average antitrust case, the roof collapse 
case proceeds through discovery stages 
expeditiously. 
Lundquist: I agree that there are cases with complex subject 
matter. However, there are also lawyers who enjoy 
a certain mystique by making a case complex; they 
like to speak the language of their case. The patent 
bar does this. A federal district court judge in San 
Francisco recently complained to me about a com- 
plex patent case. The judge was outraged because 
neither he nor the jury could understand the case. 
The expert attorneys and the expert witnesses were 
speaking only to each other and ignoring everyone 
else. 
Rubin: Is there any reason to treat differently the case that 
is complicated because it is difficult to understand 
from the case that is protracted because the law- 
yers or parties are very difficult to deal with? 
Salzman: I think so; I think that one ought to allow 
complicated cases to proceed without interference, 
but the potentially protracted case should be eon- 
trolled from the outset and should be subject to 
discovery restrictions. 
Rubin: How would you distinguish the case that ought to 
be controlled from the case that should be permit- 
ted to go its own way? Who would identify the 
case? How would they identify it? How would the 
case be treated differently from the complicated 
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Salzman: 
Lundquist: 
Kirkham: 
Rubin: 
Salzman: 
case? 
Experience has taught all of us some answers. 
Large antitrust cases with class action aspects 
(price-fixing cases), regardless of their inherent 
simplicity, often become cumbersome. In such a 
case, it is in the defendant's interest to protract the 
litigation, either to wear down the plaintiff or to get 
the benefit of holding expensive money for as long 
as possible prior to settlement. Most defendants 
think they will eventually settle the case, and be- 
cause they don't expect to lose anything from de- 
lay, they protract. In large class action antitrust 
cases we can predict that undue delay will occur. 
I think Jerry is correct. Very often, a case is 
designedly made complex because it is in the inter- 
est of one party or the other to make it so. To 
achieve wear-down exposure, bring a lot of people 
in. If the attorney wants to assert that the case is 
beyond the grasp of jurors, he goes in every direc- 
tion to make the case inordinately complex. The 
other side seeks to keep it simple. Ours is an adver- 
sary system; we respect and understand these 
processes. Over the years, depending on the interest 
I have had for a client, I have gone in one direction 
or the other. 
I think that we are describing a situation that was. 
I think that everyone is completely fed up with the 
big case and its excessive discovery and expense. 
The plaintiff bar and the defense bar are beginning 
to recognize that both sides are responsible to see 
that simple cases do not become complex and that 
complex cases do not become more complex. 
There is something implicit in our discussion that I 
would like to make explicit to see if we all agree. 
Are we not saying that the lawyers, through experi- 
ence, know whether a case requires special treat- 
ment, and that such a case cannot be identified 
from reading the complaint? 
Certain categories of cases are likely to be 
protracted-antitrust cases, certain types of lob-5 
actions, and so forth. Beyond that, the lawyer will 
frequently recognize an interest in the opponent to 
7411 
Rubin: 
Lundquist: 
Salzman: 
Kirkham: 
Rubin: 
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protract. 
What you are saying then is that the plaintiff or the 
defendant will recognize, from their interaction, 
that the case will become a protracted case. 
I think that is right. I cannot resist saying that we 
have a mechanism in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure that deals with this problem. The new 
procedures in rule 26(f) place the responsibility on 
the lawyers to determine how the case should be 
handled and to resolve difficulties. If the attorneys 
cannot resolve the differences, one or both of them 
can call for a judicial conference and obtain judicial 
management. The hope is that 26(0 will enable the 
lawyers to manage the case without judicial in- 
volvement; but, if they cannot do it, 26(f) permits 
early intervention in the protracted case. 
I think that 26(f) will work unless both parties have 
an interest in protracting the litigation. There has 
to be one side that needs action and feels that the 
protraction of litigation will injure his client in or- 
der for the device to work. 
I agree. Tom Barf said this not long ago when he 
was reviewing his IBM cases: One person cannot 
keep a case from being complex but any two can. If 
you have one lawyer and a judge, or two lawyers, 
who want the issues framed and the case reduced 
to size and brought to trial, it can be done. With 
respect to the complicated case, I don't think that 
anyone has a right to file a lawsuit and then just 
kick it along forever until it is an untriable case. 
The judge has to have some responsibility for the 
case; lawyers can work together, but there ought to 
be a report as the case goes along to enable the 
judge to know whether the case is being handled 
properly. 
The discussion indicates that good judicial 
management resolves some of the problems 
presented by protracted litigation, and that rule 
26(f) provides a mechanism to obtain such manage- 
ment. As I understand it, there are two situations 
2. Thomas D. Barr; Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York, New York. 
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Lundquist: 
Rubin: 
Lundquist: 
Rubin: 
in which 26(f) would not be triggered: the multidis- 
trict case and the case in which both sides have an 
interest in delay. In those situations in which there 
is a public interest in obtaining judicial manage- 
ment, but neither party sees a need to trigger 26(f), 
what do we do to identify the case and subject it to 
judicial management? 
I would want to think a while about what those 
cases might be. It is the lawyer's responsibility to 
handle his client's interests. If both lawyers deter- 
mine that judicial intervention is not desirable, the 
case will probably proceed better without judicial 
intervention than it would with such intervention 
over the objections of both sides. At the same time, 
I realize that there are cases that are put on the 
back burner and allowed to drift along, to the detri- 
ment of the client's interests. Many of these are not 
complex cases, so I don't view them as the result of 
lawyer-designed protraction. I think that the ordi- 
nary mechanism of status conferences, in which the 
judge says, "Where are you?" "Where are you go- 
ing?" "I want to get this case off my calendar 
within a certain period of time," is adequate to 
overcome most of the problems. 
Are you saying that, if all the parties agree that the 
case ought to be a donnybrook and ought to be 
fought the way World War I was fought, with tre- 
mendous sacrifices of men and materials, with bar- 
rages that continue for ten years, then the case 
should be permitted to go that way? 
No. We have procedures by which the judge comes 
in every six months and asks, "Where are you?" If 
he sees that the case is out of hand he can certainly 
get into the picture. 
One thing that I strongly feel is that once the case 
gets out of hand, the judge cannot restore order. 
I've tried. The cases that I did not succeed in man- 
aging as a trial judge escaped control when I let the 
case get too big. It's almost impossible to get the 
genie back into the bottle. I don't think you can 
rely on the notion, "Well the case has gone two 
years and has gotten out of hand; judge, come in 
7411 
Lundquist: 
Rubin: 
Salzman: 
Rubin: 
Salzman: 
Kirkham: 
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and save it." 
That may be, but on the other hand, I have seen 
judges come in and activate cases too quickly, mak- 
ing a morass of cases that the lawyers would have 
handled well. I think there is no complete answer; 
it may become a question of the judge's confidence 
in the attorneys and the attorneys' confidence in 
the judge. There is a chemistry that I don't think 
the rules can define or provide. 
The existence of any system, however, depends on 
more than a visceral, intuitive judgment that this is 
the right kind of judge who can do something, and 
this is the wrong kind of judge who can't do any- 
thing. If we are to propose any systemic kind of 
help, then we have to have some device that recog- 
nizes what kind of case it is that needs help, what 
kind of help can be given, who should help, and 
how that person is selected. 
The original question regarding judicial 
management without the request of either party as- 
sumes that there is some public interest in dispos- 
ing of a case promptly or efficiently, even though 
the lawyers on both sides seem to be content with 
the progress they are making. I am afraid that I 
cannot identify that interest. I can identify an in- 
terest in not having an overcrowded docket, but I 
think that we are taking care of that. 
I don't see any public interest in an uncrowded 
docket. But don't you think that there is a public 
interest in litigation that is not unduly expensive? 
If we make it apparent that when one party feels 
the court's intervention is necessary for efficient, 
expeditious litigation, that party can invoke judicial 
intervention, then we have met that interest. 
I don't like to be a Cassandra, but if more is not 
done to reduce the expense of litigation, the legal 
profession will be destroyed. If the courts of this 
country cannot handle litigation at a reasonable ex- 
pense, then some substitute mechanism for dispute 
settling will be needed. Judge Rifkinds said that if 
3. Simon H. Rifkind; Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, New York, New 
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he had a friend who had a claim for anything less 
than $50,000, he would advise him to forget it 
rather than file suit in federal court. 
Salzman: We often tell people to forget lawsuits because it 
will cost too much. There can be a legitimate inter- 
est in proceeding slowly, however, even though this 
raises costs. For example, in a class action antitrust 
case the class attorneys may have some interest in 
going slowly-it is difficult for them to organize, 
and they are overburdened by the talent and effort 
that the defense attorneys can put into the case. 
The defense is interested in going slowly because 
the money is in their pocket, and the interest rate 
is very high. The defendants may be earning four 
times as much in interest as they are paying their 
attorneys. Therefore, although the eventual disposi- 
tion of the case is clear to both parties from the 
outset-settlement-both parties are content to go 
slowly. 
Rubin: I still think that there may be a public interest in 
judicial management of the case even when it is in 
the interest of both sides not to act precipitately 
with respect to discovery and trial. I think that the 
public interest exists because, as assumed in your 
hypothetical, we have a class action. Notice has 
gone out to a lot of people who won't be hearing 
anything about the case, and they will be con- 
cerned: "What is happening in my case? I've got a 
right to know this; I'm a member of the class. I 
haven't heard anything for six months or a year." 
Another thing that happens in these cases is that, 
although the attorneys are satisfied with the pro- 
gress, at a later stage of the case the public be- 
comes aware of the action and views the case as be- 
ing typical of the judicial process. Suppose the case 
took four years to conclude and ended up being set- 
tled. Nothing much is visible on the public record 
in terms of judicial proceedings despite the tremen- 
dous discovery and negotiation efforts. Suddenly, 
there is a request for $750,000 in attorney fees. The 
- 
York. 
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public doesn't understand. For these reasons I 
think there is a public interest in having such a 
case under management even if the management 
consists of getting everyone together and finding 
out that attorney X, who represents the plaintiff 
class, is conscientious and is going forth as well as 
the case permits, and attorney Y, who represents 
the defendants, is not unduly dilatory. Thus, even 
in the case that doesn't require active management 
by the court in the sense of compulsory grooves, 
there is an interest in early identification of the 
case and some kind of judicial proceeding that will 
let the lawyers know that they have an obligation 
other than what they perceive to be the interest of 
their client. 
Lundquist: You state a valid public interest. But I think that 
there is another public interest in judicial manage- 
ment. In the context of protracted litigation, the 
lawyers arguably are working in a conflict of inter- 
est situation. The plaintiff lawyer who prolongs a 
case is justifying a fee for himself. At the same 
time, the defense lawyer is being paid on an hourly 
basis. I think that one of the leading conflict of in- 
terest situations of our day arises in the context of 
the hourly charge and the possibility of making a 
case protracted. Lawyers should be very sensitive to 
this. The conflict is such that it behooves the judi- 
ciary, in the public's interest, to be concerned. As 
to how to handle the case, I think it perfectly re- 
spectable for a judge to say, "I am going to have 
this case off my docket in two years and you ought 
to plan accordingly.'' Let the lawyers work within 
that. As long as the time frame established by the 
judge is reasonable, this type of intervention is 
proper. Of course, if something unforeseen comes 
up, one would expect the judge to be reasonable. 
Kirkham: Perhaps we should change our focus and discuss 
the next question on the outline: What can be done 
before a complaint is filed to avoid delay and 
expense? 
One factor is the extent of precomplaint inves- 
tigation done by the plaintiff. In general, there are 
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two situations with regard to precomplaint work. 
One is government-initiated litigation; the other is 
private litigation. There is no excuse for the gov- 
ernment to bring an action without knowing what 
the issues are. In government actions, discovery 
should be very specific and controlled because the 
government has ample opportunity to obtain evi- 
dence before the case is filed. Before filing a case, 
the government should know what it will do. Such 
was not the case in the AT&T case,' the IBM case: 
the Cereal litigation,' or the FTC-Exxon case.' In 
the Exxon case the government filed a thirteen-vol- 
ume, 1400-page demand subpoena. The administra- 
tive law judge remonstrated and said, "Go back and 
rethink it. If you can't file a discovery motion that 
looks toward a case that is triable, then you better 
look again." The judge was correct; there's no ex- 
cuse for such conduct. 
Now in the private case, because the private 
litigant does not have the right to go into the books 
of the potential defendant, the plaintiff has more of 
a problem, and discovery after the filing of a case is 
legitimately broader than it is in the government- 
initiated case. However, one of the biggest 
problems we have in complex cases is that a plain- 
tiff can file a case under Rule 8 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure that doesn't state any is- 
sue at all. Class action cases are the worst manifes- 
tation of this problem. The minute there is any ru- 
mor of a government investigation, lawyers jump in 
all over the country creating a most ridiculous situ- 
ation. The Sugar cases are a good example. More 
than one hundred lawsuits with millions upon mil- 
lions of sugar users as class members were filed all 
over the country against practically every sugar 
4. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 74-1698 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 20, 
1978). 
5. United States v. International Business Mach. Corp., No. 69-200 (S.D.N.Y. filed 
Jan. 17, 1969). 
6. Kellogg Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, No. 8883 (filed Apr. 26, 1972; dismissed 
Sept. 10, 1981). 
7. Exxon v. Federal Trade Comm'n, No. 8934 (filed July 18, 1973). 
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company in the nation, charging a nationwide con- 
spiracy extending over half a century. When the in- 
dictment finally came down in New York, it 
charged four companies with a specific price-fixing 
arrangement arising from a single incident. In the 
meantime, every issue in the world had been 
thrown at the industry. 
Salzman: Our office has withdrawn from the class action 
antitrust practice for reasons you mentioned. We 
found that lawyers were spending forty percent of 
their time jockeying for position and very little of 
their time working on preparation of the case. 
The problem of issue identification is real but 
arises from inherent difficulties. A plaintiffs attor- 
ney, approached by a client, will make a prelimi- 
nary investigation by appealing to a distributor or a 
person who was formerly in the industry. If the at- 
torney is given compelling information, he is put in 
a bind. He has a duty at  some point to file the case 
and stop the statute of limitations. How much 
prefiling investigation can be done without compro- 
mising the damage claim? 
Rubin: And I think there are other cases. Let's take the 
typical class action racial discrimination case. It's 
very hard to find out until after discovery, which is 
not available before filing, whether there really was 
racial discrimination. All the data are in the hands 
of your opponent. The plaintiffs give a plausible ac- 
count of racial discrimination by their employer. 
These accounts make a credible class action, but 
the lawyer has no way to tell what the hiring policy 
was because no one will talk to him. Doesn't the 
plaintiffs' lawyer have a duty to file his suit and at  
least find out? 
Kirkham: But in that case he will have specific issues, he will 
have plaintiffs, and he will be able to state some- 
thing other than "These defendants have violated 
the law." 
Lundquist: Perhaps not. I know of one discrimination case in 
which the complaint was a notice-pleading com- 
plaint that alleged discrimination and even went on 
to suggest the particulars. The defendant said, "We 
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absolutely haven't so discriminated and we'll prove 
it to you." In the course of discovery the defen- 
dants gave the plaintiffs computer records of em- 
ployee hiring. The documents showed that the de- 
fendants had not discriminated in the way alleged 
but had discriminated in another way. Except for 
notice pleading the discrimination would have 
never come to the fore. I certainly favor notice 
pleading, but I think that problems may arise after 
the case gets started on the notice pleading because 
the interest of one party or the other may be to 
make discovery explosive, to make it complicated, 
or to go far beyond the noticed claim, rather than 
to focus in on it. I feel very strongly that, after the 
case gets started and after a reasonable amount of 
discovery, the lawyers should start to focus on the 
issues to ready the case for trial. 
Rubin: Is there not another factor that causes protracted 
litigation? That is, don't people who handle major 
issues in litigation have a sort of malpractice syn- 
drome, not directly in terms of malpractice, but 
rather an anxiety that unless they turn over every 
stone, they will not be doing their professional 
duty. It's not a matter of self-aggrandizement; 
they're not trying to run up the clock; they really 
are concerned that they must turn over every stone. 
Lundquist: I don't entirely agree that it doesn't tend to be run- 
ning the clock; but to refer back to what we have 
said, in some cases we use that justification to avoid 
making judgments. When you are looking for 
worms in a field and you know that they're found 
only among stones where there's moisture, looking 
in the dry area is not good judgment; you must re- 
member that what you're out to do is not to turn 
over every stone in the field, but to find worms. We 
can eliminate some of the problem by insisting that 
lawyers focus on the issues. We are not teaching 
our young lawyers to be trial lawyers. We're teach- 
ing them-and you hear this more and 
more-always to overprepare. I think Judge Pat 
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Higginbotham8 has said that overpreparedness can 
be as much of if not more of a problem than under- 
preparedness, because laywers coming into a court- 
room don't know how to bring a case to trial. 
Salzman: This problem exists in many of the cases in which 
we are involved. In part, the problem arises from 
client demands in a situation where there is much 
at stake. That client says, "Damn the torpedos, full 
speed ahead. Who knows, something might come 
up." In many cases, we have said to the client, 
"Don't do it; it's going to be counterproductive," or 
"It will give you one-tenth of one percent return on 
your money.'' The clients have told us to go ahead. 
What has happened throughout the profession is 
that the example of New York law firms operating 
in this fashion has spread to the hinterlands. The 
next thing you know you're down in Atlanta, and 
somebody in Atlanta is trying to prove that he is as 
good as the people in New York. All of the business 
is moving down there anyway, and the clients are 
used to the "no stone unturned" principle. In this 
way it becomes a practice in litigation departments 
of major firms to operate on the leave-no-stone-un- 
turned principle. The habit extends right down to 
the behavior at trial. 
Kirkham: Sometimes the defense cannot afford to leave any 
stone unturned, especially in light of notice plead- 
ing. In the Little Mother Hubbard case,@ for exam- 
ple, the government brought suit to divest the oil 
industry of its vertical holdings. When the govern- 
ment brings that kind of a case, the stakes are so 
high you can't afford to miss anything. In that case, 
for instance, we had a study made of every inde- 
pendent oil refiner that went out of business on the 
west coast between 1917 and 1930. At the outset 
there were dozens and dozens, even scores of little 
refineries; all one had to do was put up a tank, boil 
the oil, take the gasoline off the top, and throw the 
8. Patrick F. Higginbotham, United States District Judge for the Northern District 
of Texas. 
9. United States v. Standard Oil Co., No. 11584-C (S.D. Cal.). 
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rest away. As things got more efficient, of course, 
those refineries went out of existence. The govern- 
ment alleged that it was the result of a conspiracy, 
that we had thrown all these people out of business. 
So we made a survey to discover the reasons why 
every one of those refiners went out of business. 
And that was only one aspect of the refining issue. 
The government would never confine the case and 
tell us what the suit was all about. 
Salzman: Another problem arises when the government uses 
the court to accomplish structural change that 
ought to come through legislation. There has been a 
tendancy in the Justice Department to use the judi- 
cial system for sweeping changes rather than to cor- 
rect conduct recognized to be in violation of the 
law. I don't think the judicial system is designed for 
that, although it's had incredible success in certain 
social areas. 
Lundquist: I wonder if you're not going to get into the courts 
one way or the other. Assume that to further a so- 
cial policy a law is passed that prohibits companies 
from employing more than X people or having 
more than X billion dollars in assets. That legisla- 
tion is going to be in litigation immediately, and 
you're going to be back in the courts looking for 
answers. 
Salzman: Let's discuss that. A bill of this type is pending 
right now. Representative Neal Smith, of the House 
Agricultural Committee, has proposed legislation to 
restrict the size of packing houses and to limit the 
way they feed cattle.1° The Justice Department re- 
acted adversely, asserting that the legislation would 
be anticompetitive. If the law is enacted, there is 
likely to be litigation. But the litigation will be of a 
different scope than litigation charging, for exam- 
ple, that the packing houses had a shared monop- 
oly. When we deal with statutes, we focus on nar- 
row standards for overturning overly restrictive 
legislation. 
10. Small Business Preservation and Protection Act, H.R. 7197, 96th Cong., 2d 
Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 3073 (1980). 
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That is true. When a statute is challenged, the 
judge assumes a role that he more readily compre- 
hends and for which he is better trained; the judge 
determines whether the statute is constitu- 
tional-whether it violates due process or equal 
protection or has some other defect. 
But when the legislation makes reference to social 
aims, and the court is left to "flesh-out" the details, 
such as in the environmental area, the court again 
becomes the arena for sweeping change. Further- 
more, in my judgment, the courts have not done a 
bad job. 
I would like to address the statement made 
that notice pleading is a cause of some problems in 
complex cases. My view is that notice pleading re- 
mains a good thing. What happens after the notice 
pleading is what becomes critical. It is a question of 
which way you look through the telescope: Do you 
look through the wide end so the case is perceived 
broadly, or do you focus in to reduce the case to 
triable issues? Something I have advocated-and I 
think Justice Powell thought of this when he wrote 
his dissent with Justices Rehnquist and Stewart re- 
garding the recent federal rules changela-is that, 
after the case gets started in the pleadings, discov- 
ery be limited to the claims or defenses at  issue in 
the case. That's the way I would like to see the 
problem addressed. 
How would you get the attorney to focus in on the 
issues? 
I would force him to take a jury trial. The judge ', 
should say, "I want you to start preparing your lit- 
tle fact booklet for the jury." 
I couldn't agree more. I think that this touches 
upon an integral cause of complex litigation 
problems. If we look at those who are described as 
litigators in this country, we will find very few trial 
lawyers. The truth of the matter is that most big 
firms try very few jury cases each year. 
I agree with you. I ask people who say they're in 
11. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521 (1980). 
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Lundquist: 
Rubin: 
Salzman: 
Lundquist: 
Rubin: 
the litigation section of X, Y & Z how many cases 
they have tried in the last three years. It's not un- 
common to find that the average will be five or six 
per year. 
That would be unusually high. I would guess that if 
you were to poll litigation partners in major firms 
around the country you would find that a number 
of them have never tried a jury case. You would 
find a number of them who have not tried a jury 
case in ten years. This is part of the problem I pre- 
viously alluded to in which the interests of the law- 
yers lie in making a case complex and in making it 
remunerative. 
I think I generally agree that in some cases the 
judge ought to say, "This case is going to be set for 
trial to a jury six months hence and you must be 
ready.'' 
The judge must do more. The judge must also 
circumscribe the initial wave of discovery for both 
sides. I believe that it is essential to promulgate 
pattern interrogatories, discovery requests, and 
documents requests. 
Another thing the judge must do is to set limits on 
trial length. I think lawyers become used to time 
limits when they are set. You can go to the Su- 
preme Court and be given a half hour on the most 
important case in the world and say that's fine, be- 
cause you're used to it. But if somebody says to you 
that you're going to have to try a case to a jury in a 
certain period of time, it gets a different visceral re- 
action. I think that this kind of management can 
make litigation much more effective. 
I agree basically, perhaps entirely, with your 
suggestion, but I have two questions about ap- 
proaching the matter from that standpoint. Sup- 
pose one or, indeed, both parties say to the judge, 
"But judge, this is not that kind of case; you have it 
wrong. This is just a tremendous case and I need 
time; I need more than six months." How does the 
judge avoid becoming tyrannical? How does he 
identify whether the protests are genuine? 
Salzman: I think I can give you a start on the answer. 
Kirkham: 
Salzman: 
Rubin: 
Lundquist: 
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Perhaps the judge should become a bit tyrannical 
and say, "This is the first wave. You come back to 
me in three months after you have actually looked 
at these documents and tell me what else you need, 
why you need it, and what you're going to do. Be 
prepared to explain to me why you have to put on 
more than X witnesses from each defendant." Let 
the lawyers come back after the documents have 
been produced, after the interrogatories have been 
answered. 
I agree with these proposals with respect to certain 
types of cases. Maybe we need to remember that 
there are cases which really are huge such as the 
IBM case and AT&T case. In those cases, unless 
you are bifurcating the case, the limits are not fair 
because you don't have a case that can be prepared 
in six months. 
The Western Sugar casela could have been ready 
for trial in a much shorter time had it been in the 
interest of the parties. There were eight or ten key 
dispositions, and the rest was wasted effort. 
I think Jerry is suggesting something that I heard 
best summed up by Judge Hubert Will," a great 
trial judge. He said that in those situations the 
judge should be reasonably arbitrary but not unrea- 
sonably arbitrary. 
One last question relating to the propriety of 
focusing in from the pleadings: If notice pleading is 
permitted the case cannot be limited to the issues 
until the issues are known; there must be some dis- 
covery, must there not, between the filing of the 
pleadings and the definition of the issues? 
It is a question of refining the definition of issues. I 
think that in the broader sense an issue is present 
when there is a complaint and an answer, or a com- 
plaint and the various responsive pleadings. Those 
pleadings have then framed certain issues. A classic 
abuse of notice pleading occurred in some cases in- 
12. In re Sugar Antitrust Litigation, [I9771 1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 1 61,373 (MDL No. 
201, N.D. Cal. fled May 21, 1976). 
13. Hubert L. Will, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois 
(senior status). 
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volving the National Football League. Once the is- 
sues were framed it was insisted that discovery be 
permitted of every one of the NFL teams on things 
which were not germane to the law suit but which 
were customary discovery items around the rest of 
the country. Now, that is where I think the judge 
should start to focus in on the law suit and not al- 
low the attorneys to pursue discovery into every- 
thing that is merely of conceivable relevance. The 
problem is partially caused by judges. Judges have 
too often said, "Well that's discovery and I'm not 
going to get into that," and have not really paid the 
attention that they should. What I would call for 
probably is a little more judicial intervention to 
keep discovery from exploding. 
Rubin: Before the others comment, let me ask one more 
question. How do we give the judge incentive to 
spend some of his time-perhaps an appreciable 
amount of time-getting into the case, finding out 
what the issues are, and limiting discovery? 
Lundquist: A partial incentive is that if judges get into the case 
early and efficiently, they will actually save them- 
selves time. Judges who are close to the cases tend 
to be the most efficient and to dispose of more 
cases. Rarely will a judge who does not involve him- 
self in the diacovery processes be an efficient mover 
or trier of cases. Rather, the converse is true. Per- 
haps many judges wonder whether time is better 
used by getting into the discovery fray or by leav- 
ing it to the magistrates. I would like to see these 
judges become involved in discovery. That is what 
the lawyers want. Lawyers want judges in the pic- 
ture, and such involvement is more efficient for 
judges in the long run. 
Rubin: How do you feel about it, Jerry? 
Salzman: I believe we need ten or fifteen specially designated 
judges located in centers where complex cases are 
filed. Complex cases could be assigned to those 
judges. Their dockets would be limited to fifteen or 
twenty complex cases. That would require the 
judges to do three trials a year in addition to man- 
aging the other cases. I think this would be the 
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cheapest way to do it, because judges are probably 
the least expensive part of the judicial system. 
They don't get paid a lot of money; neither do their 
clerks. In addition, such a system would be the 
most certain way to encourage legitimate settle- 
ment negotiations because the parties could not 
avoid speedy trials. Appointing special judges 
would also partially alleviate the burden on other 
judges in those same districts, which usually have 
unbearable criminal dockets. Almost all major ur- 
ban centers have tremendous criminal dockets to 
deal with, and these complex cases don't often 
come up in rural locations. Therefore, we need to 
create special judgeships. Whether these judges 
would handle only complex cases during their ten- 
ure is problematic. I believe it would be best to ro- 
tate judges into the special status for three, four, or 
five years, and then bring them back to ordinary 
status. 
Lundquist: That may be ideal, but I don't think it is realistic. 
There isn't any likelihood that the Congress, the 
people, or the judges will accept it. We really need 
to focus more on what we can do with the existing 
system and judges to solve the problem. 
Rubin: What about a system that is somewhere between 
the random selection of judges and the designation 
or appointment of special judges: authorizing the 
chief judge of the various major districts or the 
chief judges of the courts of appeals to select judges 
to whom these matters would be referred based on 
their presumed competence and experience. 
Lundquist: I would want to think a little more about it. I have 
a kind of halfway solution of my own: allowing each 
attorney to peremptorily challenge one federal 
judge per case. This at least gives the lawyer a little 
latitude within a given district. I would like to see 
that as a first step. 
However, the notion of assigning cases to par- 
ticular judges does exist in multidistrict litigation. 
The case is assigned to a particular judge by the 
panel, and generally speaking this works well. How- 
ever, a little forum shopping occurs because at- 
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Rubin: 
Salzman: 
Rubin: 
Salzman: 
Kirkham: 
Lundquist: 
torneys file cases in districts where they know 
judges are better equipped to handle them. 
I understand, Jerry, that your experience with the 
panel has been one of delay regarding the designa- 
tion of judges. 
No, the panel generally acts quickly, and there are 
several judges around the country to whom they as- 
sign these cases. But I want to create a situation in 
which these judges can be relieved of some portion 
of their ordinary dockets so that everybody knows 
that these judges are actually going to try three 
complex cases each year. Let's take some very good 
judges in Chicagdudge Marshall14 or Judge Will, 
for example. They can't give trial dates for big 
cases because it means setting aside a great deal of 
time. The defendants invariably threaten a six- 
month trial, and two months is a fairly reasonable 
estimate. The threat of setting a date for a trial is 
not realistic because both sides know that if they 
can give the judge an excuse he must accept it. 
There is an alternative that depends again on 
judicial administration. The Judge Marshalla and 
the Judge Wills could be relieved of the more rou- 
tine cases. Could we not use existing mechanisms to 
handle both routine and complex cases rather than 
create a special mechanism to handle complex 
cases? 
In any event, I think we need additional judgeships 
and special courts. The statistics from the Adminis- 
trative Office show that the district court judges in 
urban centers have an overwhelming caseload. 
This gets back to a very fundamental problem- 
work volume and income. It's disgraceful what we 
pay our judges, and yet we still expect to get good 
men. We need more judges, and we need to com- 
pensate them better. 
There is no question about that. I thought that 
what you were going to suggest with your center, 
Jerry, was more teaching, with the judges who are 
14. Prentice H. Marshall, United States District Judge for the Northern District of 
Illinois. 
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doing the best job sharing their information with 
others. I think such an educative process could be 
very helpful. It is my perception that some judges 
have the personality, instinct, and knowledge to 
run a better calendar, try more cases and move 
more cases along. Other judges don't. The former 
ought to instruct the latter. Some judges don't like 
to try cases; they prefer to become managers and 
settlers. Indeed, there are some interesting statis- 
tics regarding the number of cases actually tried in 
certain districts. They show that some federal dis- 
trict judges like to try cases and, in fact, do so. 
Others, seemingly, don't like trying cases at  all. 
Rubin: Well, part of it is the judge's vision of himself-in 
current terminology, his self-image. What does a 
judge think judging consists of? If a judge's concept 
of judging is to be on a bench in a black robe say- 
ing, "I sustain" or "I overrule that objection," it is 
very hard to get him to move into effective pretrial 
discovery. If a judge, like Judge Marshall and 
Judge Will, believes that the role of the judge is to 
assist in the administration of justice, then he is 
apt to act differently. You have to help the judge 
reshape his image of judging. 
Lundquist: Having sat on a committee of lawyers and judges 
that has worked on these types of problems for four 
years now, I think the solution finds partial root in 
education. Everyone needs to understand that law- 
yers like strong judicial control and early interven- 
tion. They also want the issues shaped to facilitate 
the trying of complex cases. Judges have the power 
to take control and probably had it before the rules 
changes. It's a question of getting the judges to use 
that power and to understand that lawyers want 
them to use it. I think that a lot of the changes we 
see are not so much changes in powers the judges 
have, but in the sense of direction judges take. 
Rubin: Judicial intervention occurs at a conference that is 
triggered either by the court sua sponte or by the 
request of one or both parties. The mechanism by 
which the judge takes control is the rule 20(0 sta- 
tus conference. The judge should either find out if 
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the parties know what the issues are or determine 
how much discovery is needed to reveal those 
issues. 
Lundquist: I should point out that we also tossed a little extra 
leverage for the judges into rule 37(g). We said that 
if the party or his attorney won't in good faith par- 
ticipate in framing the issues, then the judge may 
charge attorney's fees against that party. So both 
the stick and the carrot are there. Hopefully it will 
start something going. 
Salzman: Judicial control seems to vary with the number of 
parties and attorneys involved. A conference with 
the judge, three lawyers on one side and two law- 
yers on the other side, ordinarily results in some 
reasonable resolution. The parties identify the indi- 
viduals whose depositions are to be taken, agree on 
a schedule, and so forth. But if there are fifteen de- 
fendants and each has three lawyers at the confer- 
ence, the conference takes on a different tone. It 
doesn't focus on the issue of what discovery is going 
to be taken, but instead focuses on the procedural 
steps that will identify what discovery is subse- 
quently going to be taken and how the parties are 
going to object to the discovery. This conference 
sets the stage for disagreement, and the case can go 
six or seven months before the first discovery rul- 
ing, and then another three months will pass before 
production. 
Rubin: How would you like to see that changed? 
Salzman: I think we need pattern discovery tools on the 
model of jury instructions. Illinois has them in all 
personal injury cases. As soon as the complaint is 
filed, the court promulgates explicit interrogatories 
and document requests that the parties are re- 
quired to respond to. There could be a very nice, 
limited set of court-promulgated discovery devices 
about which no one can argue and to which no one 
wil l  object. 
Kirkham: Exactly what would those be when the plaintif€ just 
makes some broad, general statement that the de- 
fendant conspired to violate the antitrust laws? 
Salzman: I really don't understand all this talk about the 
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problems of notice pleading. I've never had any 
such problem with the practice we have: we are 
fairly restricted. Even the Western Sugar case was 
fairly restricted in terms of the allegations. But if a 
defendant were genuinely confused, the court could 
legitimately ask the plaintiff, "Can't you tell me an- 
ything other than that?" If the plaintiff were una- 
ble to, the court could say, "You've got your choice: 
you can ask interrogatories relating to price-fixing 
or you can ask interrogatories relating to other vio- 
lations, but I'm not going to give you 500 interroga- 
tories. Here are the six or seven you can choose 
from." 
Lundquist: This is directly germane to what we proposed in 
the latest rule change, but the Supreme Court did 
not adopt it. The Advisory Committee to the Rules 
Committee to the Supreme Court is entertaining 
the notion of imposing a threshold limit of thirty 
interrogatories; to file more than that you would 
have to go to the court and explain why. 
Salzman: That rule is in force in some districb, but it is 
subject to avoidance. Attorneys avoid the limitation 
by substituting instructions for questions. But that 
is not the issue. Even if a party is limited to thirty 
questions, there is no guarantee of any prompt re- 
sponse. Ordinarily, six months elapse before the 
usual objections are resolved and another three 
months before the answers are filed. In the process 
of fighting about discovery, everything is compro- 
mised. Invariably, a second wave of discovery is 
needed to cure the compromises. Rather than a 
limitation on requests and interrogatories, we need 
pattern document requests and interrogatories. I 
would even suggest compulsory 30(b)(6) depositions 
of certain corporate officers and defendants to iden- 
tify categories of documents and modes of doing 
business. Of course, these forms would be modified 
as experience dictates. 
In the Corrugated Carton casel%e filed five 
15. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 310 (S.D. Tex. filed 
Jan. 25, 1980). 
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interrogatories: Who were the employees who did 
business with the plaintiffs? Who saw the grand 
jury transcripts? How were they dispersed? Where 
are they now? What did you sell the plaintiffs? The 
objections to those have taken six months to re- 
solve. I limited myself to five because I thought I'd 
get an answer in a week. 
Lundquist: I'm uncomfortable when we start to talk about the 
multidistrict panel cases and complex cases at  the 
same time. I almost regard those as different ani- 
mals. Complex cases merit different treatment be- 
cause they present special problems. As I listen to 
us, I start to smile to myself and say, "Maybe the 
best thing to do is to give up panels and not have 
any multidistrict cases." No one likes the manual 
any more; it's going to be redone and many agree 
that it has created far more problems than it has 
solved. 
Rubin: I have just been appointed to the Committee for 
the Manual on Complex Litigation, so I'd welcome 
any suggestions. 
Kirkham: Hasn't the Committee asked Professor Miller1% 
prepare a revision? 
Rubin: He's been employed as a consultant. I don't know 
whether any specific directions have yet been given 
to him. They may have been. 
Salzman: What about having an appendix that lists 
appropriate interrogatories or appropriate first sets 
of interrogatories or documents? 
Kirkham: The manual already includes a first "wave" of 
interrogatories. These were taken from specific 
cases and they worked just fine in those cases. Ap- 
plied to some other case, however, they may be 
monstrous. 
Rubin: There is another problem with the Committee's 
proposal on limiting interrogatories: many lawyers 
tell me, "Okay, I'll ask only twenty interrogatories, 
but I'll take twenty more depositions. You're sim- 
ply forcing me to find out some of the information I 
16. Arthur R. Miller, Professor of Law, Harvard University Law School, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
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would otherwise elicit by interrogatories through 
depositions-the more expensive way." 
Salzman: That ignores what is plainly stated: it is a threshold 
limitation. The other side can agree to interrogato- 
ries beyond the threshold. If it is a choice between 
interrogatories or depositions, I think the other 
lawyer would agree to additional interrogatories to 
avoid going through twenty depositions. If he 
won't, you just say to the court, "In this kind of 
case we need more." Such a rule has operated in 
Massachusetts since time began. It's the rule in the 
state courts in Chicago. Eighteen federal district 
courts have some variation of the rule. The Com- 
mittee has proposed the rule because the bar has 
reported more abuse in the filing of excessive inter- 
rogatories than anything else. It's not designed to 
shut out any segment of the bar or to prohibit in- 
terrogatories when they are the most efficient 
approach. 
Kirkham: I don't think an arbitrary limit of ten or twenty 
interrogatories is necessarily the answer. One of the 
interrogatories propounded to the Standard Oil 
Company was, "If you have destroyed any paper 
during the year X relating to the production, trans- 
portation, refining, or sale of oil or petroleum prod- 
ucts, then state who wrote the document, to whom 
it was sent, what the substance of it was, when it 
was destroyed, and why." In my objection to that 
interrogatory, I took a picture of the pile of docu- 
ments that is taken each night from the Standard 
Oil Building. It filled a truck. Thousands and tens 
of thousands of documents were destroyed every 
day, and this interrogatory called for a description. 
A limitation doesn't resolve that problem. 
Salzman: If you need an interrogatory like that, a pattern 
interrogatory would say, "Describe all documents 
destroyed otherwise than in the ordinary course of 
business," or "Somehow categorize the documents." 
It can be done. If you get a few smart people 
spending a little time, they can come up with pat- 
tern interrogatories and pattern document requests 
that are as useful as pattern jury instructions, if the 
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Kirkham: 
Salzman: 
Lundquist: 
Rubin: 
Salzman: 
judges are educated to use them and take that kind 
of control. Numerical limitations are not helpful 
because they just lead to disputes about the objec- 
tions. Pattern interrogatories eliminate this prob- 
lem. They are proposed and discussed, and after 
discussion the judge says, "These are the interroga- 
tories and no objections will be heard. Get your an- 
swers in." 
But you would have a court session of twenty days 
just to go through a set of interrogatories. 
That's if lawyers propose them. But I'm talking 
about starting with an appendix of pattern 
interrogatories. 
I recall a federal district judge who threw out a 
sheaf of eighty pages of interrogatories without 
reading them. He said it was preposterous to file 
eighty pages of subquestions. The courts have come 
to the point where they say, "That's intolerable, we 
just won't even start to read them." We need to 
move toward what Jerry is suggesting. 
Let's go back to the problem alluded to by Jerry. 
At some stage you will have specific interrogatories 
devised by counsel. Inevitably, objections will be 
raised. The process of hearing the objections and 
disposing of them is unduly lengthy and intolerably 
expensive. What is the answer to that? What is a 
possible solution? 
One thing that is not the answer is the magistrate 
system. In the Western Sugar case, for example, 
the defendants propounded gigantic sets of inter- 
rogatories about matters that really could never 
have been issues in the case. There were intermina- 
ble meetings and attempts to negotiate. Neither 
side wanted to negotiate, but they had to hold the 
meetings for the sake of form. When the parties 
sought a ruling by the court, the judge threw up his 
hands and said, "Wait a second. I'll never be able 
to deal with this case if I have to listen to you fel- 
lows all day and all night." Therefore, he assigned 
it to a magistrate. Then, the following occurred: a 
briefing schedule before the magistrate, arguments 
before the magistrate, an opinion by the magistrate, 
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a motion to the magistrate for reconsideration of 
the opinion, rebriefing, opinion confirmed, appeal 
to the court, the court stating, "On the grounds 
available to me to overturn a magistrate's ruling, I 
probably can't reverse, but I'll look at it any way," 
and on and on. You end up with nothing of any 
value to anybody, except the benefit the defendant 
derives from causing the plaintiff to expend energy. 
Rubin: What do we do about it? I hear this all the time 
and I see it sometimes. What can be done? 
Salzman: Let's start with a pattern situation. The judge 
propounds the interrogatories and document re- 
quests to each side as a suggestion. He's done it, 
there's no objection to it, and the answers must be 
forthcoming. At  some point a party should be enti- 
tled to come before the judge and show why partic- 
ular further document requests or particular fur- 
ther interrogatories are needed. It should be a 
procedure without the delays that are presently in- 
herent in the federal rules dealing with answers to 
interrogatories. A person who has thirty days to an- 
swer or object always waits thirty days to object. 
Then he stalls the meeting for another thirty days, 
and negotiation goes on for another thirty days on 
top of that. You're already at three months. An ex- 
tended briefing schedule is de rigueur because a 
large number of parties must coordinate. This 
causes inordinate delay. 
Kirkham: Jerry, you're talking about dealing with a monster 
that should not have been conceived in the first 
place. If the set of interrogatories is reasonably 
small, you ordinarily don't have that delay. 
Salzman: I disagree. Our questions were, "Please identify 
who saw the grand jury transcripts" and "Do they 
still have them?" Six and a half months later we 
don't have a ruling. 
Lundquist: There is a difficulty with your solution, Jerry. How 
does the judge get familiar enough with the case to 
decide what the issues are and which pattern de- 
vices to use? 
Salzman: I'm not familiar with cases in which the issues are 
so undefined. When does this happen? 
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Kirkham: 
Salzman: 
Lundquist: 
Salzman: 
Lundquist: 
Rubin: 
Take any class action antitrust case-any one. 
The class action antitrust case breaks into two 
natural parts: The issue of whether there is an ap- 
propriate class (and there are certain kinds of dis- 
covery necessary for that), and the other issues. 
Most of the class action antitrust cases have been 
price-fixing cases. The kinds of questions that 
ought to be asked in those cases are not 
complicated. 
That is when you need a neutral person because 
the defendant in that case can think of thousands 
of questions which would indicate that it's not a 
class or that there are all kinds of subclasses, and 
the plaintiff is obviously trying to focus on ques- 
tions that will give it all the ingredients of making 
a rule 23 class. 
Anybody who has ever tried to make use of an 
interrogatory answer knows that those thousands of 
questions are best asked by deposing the individu- 
als from the various companies. In these cases, 
there are judges who say, "Wait a second. Instead 
of asking these interrogatories, which result in an- 
swers that are totally useless for a jury and which 
really don't get any information you don't already 
know, write up a narrative statement, one sentence 
at a time, and the opposing party will either admit 
it or deny it." In the alternative, the opponents can 
write up a narrative statement about their 
company. 
If we are talking about the usefulness of 
interrogatories, I think we all pretty much agree 
that they aren't really useful. That is why I'm not 
troubled with limitations or patterns. I do not 
think interrogatories are useful, either as discovery 
tools or at trial. 
It certainly has been implicit throughout our 
discussion that we are talking about multitiered 
procedures for discovery. The relatively simple di- 
versity automobile accident case or the Jones Act 
case goes on one track, which may employ magis- 
trates for discovery and which may be routine, and 
the case that is complex or protracted goes on an- 
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other track. I understand all of you to agree that, in 
the latter case, the judge himself, rather than a 
magistrate or some other official, ought to be giving 
personal attention to discovery control, starting 
with the interrogatories. 
Judge Greenel7 has been using a novel device 
in the AT&T case. The parties have claimed privi- 
lege on literally thousands, perhaps hundreds of 
thousands, of documents. To expedite the tremen- 
dously time-consuming job of ruling on the claims, 
Judge Greene has appointed two law professors as 
special masters to superintend discovery. In the 
case that gets beyond the time that the judge can 
personally give, is that a useful device or is it a de- 
vice to use once in a century? 
Kirkham: On an issue of that kind it is a useful device. 
Lundquist: In special instances it's probably appropriate. The 
use of law school professors makes me, think about 
the evidence professor who once said to his class, 
"That's what the evidence cases say anyway. 
Whether the trial courts follow those rules, I have 
no idea; I've never been to a trial." I have a little 
concern in that respect. 
Rubin: Judge Greene just handed down a ruling in which 
he defined what privilege would consist of in the 
AT&T case.18 The opinion gave guidelines: This 
document is privileged, this is not; this is how you 
identify the claimed privilege-you must attach an 
affidavit concerning why it's privileged, and so 
forth. Would it be helpful in complex cases, and in- 
deed in all cases, if the judge had an individual 
document about discovery generally: "This is my 
discovery policy. I admit this, I exclude that. I sus- 
tain this kind of objection." 
Salzman: The lawyers at our office often try to get judges to 
do it in the course of pretrial conferences. They 
say, "By the way, your honor, we understand so 
and so is going to be raising these kinds of objec- 
tions," hoping the judge can give some indication. 
17. Harold H. Greene, United States District Judge for the District of Columbia. 
18. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 86 F.R.D. 603 (D.D.C. 1980). 
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Lundquist: 
Salzman: 
Kirkham: 
Rubin: 
Lundquist: 
Some judges say, "You know I don't give advisory 
opinions." Others give indications, but they don't 
make any difference because they aren't binding, 
and people continue to raise objections. It's in their 
strategic interest to do so, and you wind up with 
the same donnybrook. What I thought would have 
been interesting for Judge Greene to do in that cir- 
cumstance would be to say, "I want you to catego- 
rize the types of privileged documents you have 
and give me five examples of each. I will give you 
some rulings on those documents. Then I will ask 
you to go back and look at the other documents. 
You draw your own conclusions based on my rul- 
ings. I will take any documents for which you con- 
tinue to claim privilege and look at them again, but 
this time there will be some penalty attached for a 
wrongful claim of privilege in light of my prior 
ruling." 
Thereafter the judge should say, "I'm going to strip 
issues, I'm going to add issues, I'm going to do 
things that redly make the case start to take 
shape." 
Judges must also penalize either attorneys or 
clients for recalcitrant behavior during discovery 
cases. 
I agree with that. 
Is good faith a defense? When we consider 
penalizing attorneys or clients, the answer almost 
invariably is that the attorney had a good faith be- 
lief that the objection was well founded. 
A defense of good faith must be questioned. The 
attorney is trained to reason from fact and prece- 
dent and should be held to his judgment. The idea 
that Jerry suggests is intriguing. The judge says, 
"I'll rule on X documents out of a hundred thou- 
sand to give you an idea of how discovery should 
proceed. " 
I think sophisticated services like statistical 
sampling could be useful to a court. One percent of 
the vote can be evaluated to determine who will 
win a political election. Likewise, the statistical 
evaluation of documents and rulings could be very 
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helpful in giving meaning to how a court will rule 
on relevance, privilege, or other issues in a case. For 
example, if somebody asks to look at one half mil- 
lion documents in a price-fixing case and the other 
side replies that the request is absolutely unreason- 
able, that it would take X number of paralegals X 
hundred hours, the court, or the parties by agree- 
ment, could appoint an auditor to go out and pull a 
statistical sampling of the half million documents 
requested. The parties could then come back to the 
court and say, "Based on the sample I think that it 
would be worth pursuing more in this area," or, "I 
am satisfied that we can establish this." More so- 
phisticated procedures could help a court make dis- 
covery rulings and determine what was needed in 
enormous cases in which hundreds of thousands of 
documents must be examined for statistical or ac- 
counting information. 
Rubin: I think we are approaching a national bar, 
particularly in complex cases. It's highly desirable 
that there not be forum shopping to facilitate dis- 
covery or to find the best judge or jury, and that 
lawyers have some guidelines by which to shape 
their conduct and advise their clients. Therefore, 
judges ought not to fashion ad hoc rules. That 
would not guarantee that every judge will rule pre- 
cisely alike in every borderline situation. But if you 
build a repertoire of rulings, you will find some ten- 
dency toward uniformity. The judicial process by 
nature tends toward uniformity. If the judge is 
presented with some objections to interrogatories of 
a kind he never has considered before or with a 
suggestion by counsel Lundquist that he appoint a 
special master to make a sampling of documents, 
the first thing he does is see what some other court 
has done. 
Lundquist: I think what both you and Jerry said is salutory. 
When you get down to the nitty gritty, one of the 
problems with discovery is that there are too few 
precedents to go by: you don't have rulings, partly 
because judges have stayed out of that process and 
haven't given enough decisions to guide people. 
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Rubin: Weyman, how would you feel-and I ask you 
specifically because of your role on the ABA Special 
Committee on Discovery Abuse-about a massive 
educational effort specifically directed at discovery 
that would include judges and perhaps even feature 
judges? We would hold a nationwide series of semi- 
nars on improving discovery methods and strongly 
encourage state and federal judges, particularly 
judges in courts of general jurisdiction, and litigat- 
ing members of the bar to attend. 
Lundquist: It's an exciting idea, one that I would recommend. I 
have heard trial judges comment on how much they 
have picked up from such an interchange, and I 
think it would be progressive and helpful. One, it 
would give more of a national cast to rulings, par- 
ticularly in federal courts, where I think it's more 
important. And two, it would provide an in- 
terchange of experience from which all participants 
benefit. There remains a parochialism among law- 
yers, and perhaps more so, among the judges be- 
tween circuits and even districts. Such an in- 
terchange could break that down. 
Rubin: To a large degree federal judges are already 
educated in this manner: newly appointed judges 
attend a seminar for one week or more, and more 
experienced judges attend periodic seminars. There 
are also seminars for state judges. But judges act 
against their own background as lawyers, and they 
remain members of the legal profession. I think we 
need some common education that is directed on a 
much broader scale to lawyers and judges together, 
so that they conceptualize the problems alike and 
reach a consensus about a method that does not 
leave the bar, or large numbers of the bar, feeling 
that, if a judge tries to adopt a management tech- 
nique, he's being tyrannical or arbitrary or fighting 
the customary methods of the bar. 
Salzman: This type of exchange is going on to some extent 
among those judges who have multidistrict cases. I 
know they discuss the issues on an informal basis 
because a judge will tell you, "I was just talking to 
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Rubin: 
Judge PointerlB and this is what he did under these 
circumstances, and it sounds pretty good to me," or 
"I just talked to Judge Will and I don't care what 
Judge Will did, that is not what's going to be done 
down here." 
The multidistrict panel has periodic meetings, I 
believe every six months. They have two basically 
different emphases. One is to talk about specific 
cases, not in terms of how they are to be decided, 
but where they are and what the progress is. The 
other is to discuss generally techniques for handling 
multidistrict cases. 
Lundquist: In these panel meetings do the judges sit down and 
discuss what lawyers have thought about how they 
handled the cases? It seems to me that if judges 
want to establish how effective they are with mul- 
tidistrict cases, how quickly they can move them 
along, or how innovative they can be, a little hind- 
sight evaluation of what the lawyers who were 
before them thought while they were going through 
these exciting experiences would be informative. 
Rubin: I think every business needs consumer surveys. 
Judges need consumer surveys too. The problem 
with doing precisely what you talk about is that 
generally lawyers fear they will come before a judge 
again; so they want to be complimentary in some 
degree, even if they think he was horrible. 
We are trying something right now that will be 
of interest to you. I am chairman of a subcommit- 
tee to the Committee of Court Administration that 
has been charged with looking into possible alter- 
natives to jury trials in complex protracted cases. 
The Federal Judicial Center is undertaking a series 
of interviews. We have selected twenty protracted 
cases-cases that took a considerable amount of 
time to try. Trained interviewers will personally in- 
terview the judges in each of these twenty cases. 
We have a schedule for the interviewer to follow 
outlining all things that should be touched on. This 
19. Sam C. Pointer, United States District Judge for the Northern District of 
Alabama. 
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is not a question and answer check off sort of thing. 
It's conducted on a personal basis, but, to be sure 
the interview is thorough, the schedule calls for a 
variety of inquiries into discovery, the handling of 
jury charges, and other matters. Separately, we are 
interviewing two lawyers in each case. If the case 
involved two parties, there will be one plaintiffs 
lawyer and one defendant's lawyer. If the case in- 
volved more than two parties, then we will select 
counsel with diverse interests. The judges and law- 
yers will be anonymous, and the cases will not be 
identified. We hope to get from these forty lawyer 
interviews at least a sampling of lawyer reaction to 
different judges and different techniques. There is 
no reason why it should not be done on a broader 
scale. I think it needs safeguards because of the 
fear that if I say something bad about Judge Rubin 
and come before Judge Rubin again, he's going to 
retaliate. 
Lundquist: That is a natural concern, although I think lawyers 
are at least somewhat willing to run that risk. 
Perhaps we should see if we've reached some 
consensus. I think that education is at least a par- 
tial solution to protracted discovery. Primarily, ed- 
ucation comes in the way Judge Rubin has sug- 
gested. However, there is nothing more instructive 
than a direct sanction. When someone gets hit with 
a fine or has an issue stripped, that spreads nation- 
wide very quickly. 
Rubin: I think we have agreed that difficult cases, whether 
they be complex or merely protracted, require dif- 
ferent discovery procedures than nondifficult cases. 
The first thing they require is personal attention 
from the judge in some systematic way. The court's 
involvement must be meaningful, not merely per- 
functory. This might take a variety of forms: exper- 
imentation with standard interrogatories, standard 
lists of witnesses who would be deposed in particu- 
lar kinds of cases, and so on. These would be pre- 
pared not by the judge alone in chambers or in an 
ivory tower, but with the assistance of lawyers ex- 
perienced in this kind of litigation. Acting on those 
Lundquist: 
Salzman: 
Rubin: 
Lundquist: 
Kirkham: 
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premises, judges and lawyers ought to be educated 
in how to use discovery devices prudently and 
expeditiously. 
I certainly don't want to endorse the notion of 
pattern interrogatories in any general sense, but I 
would agree that in some areas certain types of pat- 
tern interrogatories would be helpful. However, I 
don't think interrogatories are a high level discov- 
ery tool, and I don't think Jerry does. 
No, I put them very low, which is why I think 
pattern interrogatories are appropriate. I think 
there should be very few of them for either side, 
but I do think that if they are well defined we 
would not have to fight about them for months. 
Before we leave interrogatories, let me ask one 
question that I have my own answer to, but I would 
be interested in knowing what the rest of you think. 
Lawyers who represent indigent clients or who fre- 
quently do pro bono work assert that the interro- 
gatory is invaluable because it is the most inexpen- 
sive way to get into the lawsuit quickly. Therefore, 
when they have indigent or pro bono cases that are 
fairly complicated, they contend that they need to 
ask numerous interrogatories. 
I have no problem with that. If that's their best 
tool, the defense lawyer ought to agree to a waiver 
of any numerical limitation, and if he is unreasona- 
ble in not agreeing to it, the judge ought to give the 
public lawyer the costs involved in filing a motion 
to get beyond the threshold. It is simply a question 
of making sure that the interrogatories are the best 
tool and that they are intelligent interrogatories. If 
they are the best tool, people should not be pre- 
cluded from using them. 
One very important point, I think, is that discovery 
should be directed to issues that have been defined. 
You have to have a lawsuit. The big problem I see 
in the form interrogatories of the present Complex 
Litigation Manual is that they were drafted for rel- 
atively narrow cases. If you take those same inter- 
rogatories and apply them to a case that has very 
broad issues, they immediately become arbitrary. 
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Rubin: 
Salzman: 
Kirkham: 
Lundquist: 
I am perhaps midway between you and Jerry on 
that. Jerry does not, I think, see lack of issue defi- 
nition as a very common problem. I see it occur- 
ring, but not quite as frequently as you do. I think 
what we are envisioning in the suggestions is that, 
if the issues are not clear in a case from the outset, 
all discovery preliminarily must be directed to de- 
fining issues. At some stage the court has to say to 
the parties or the parties have to say to the court, 
"These are the issues; from now on the trial con- 
cerns these issues." 
If a party must rely upon interrogatories as his 
principal discovery device, he is in trouble. If he 
thinks he is going to prove his case from interroga- 
tories, he's dreaming. But in such a case it is no 
burden to require that the opposite side respond to 
the interrogatories since they are not going to be 
hit with duplicative depositions. 
Let me just say one thing here: I don't know 
whether I stand alone in this, but I think one of the 
real problems with complex litigation in our courts 
is that certain cases should not be in the courts. 
The idea should be emphasized that courts are con- 
stituted to try cases and controversies. Jerry says 
that there are not many cases in which discovery is 
not addressed to the issues, and that's right, but 
there are some cases in which there are no issues, 
for example, cases that allege general conspiracy on 
the part of an industry-wide group of people. I 
think the court should either use Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to force the law- 
yer to indicate what he wants the court to try or 
simply dismiss the case. I am not quite sure how to 
handle a case in which a person says he is entitled 
to discovery in order to know what the issues are. It 
seems to me that one must start out with some is- 
sue or the case is not triable. 
Isn't the issue within what you just said? Didn't 
you define it? The issue is whether there was a con- 
spiracy to do something or other, and if the plain- 
tiff says that that is the issue then the interrogato- 
ries should ask. "Did vou hold meetings on such 
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and such a date?" 
Kirkham: Perhaps, but I'm not certain it is that simple. An- 
other problem in complex litigation is the rule 
23(b)(3) class action. There is no way for a court to 
try an antitrust price-fixing case in which there are 
unlimited numbers of plaintiffs, all nonparties 
brought in through a 23(b)(3) class action, and in 
which the question to be determined is the amount 
of damages suffered by the various plaintiffs. 
Courts have tried to cope by using fluid recovery, 
which, in my view, is an unconstitutional device. At 
the very outset you have a case that is never going 
to be tried-it will be settled. The leaders of the 
bar, such as our friend Kohn,"O say that the way to 
ensure that cases like that are manageable is to cer- 
tify the classes, thereby forcing the parties to settle. 
Salzman: I don't agree with you. Our office has tried two 
23(b)(3) class actions on the plaintiffs' side and sev- 
eral on the defendants' side. For example, our office 
handled the Cast-Iron Pipe case" before Judge 
Pointer. Although there were 750 to 800 class mem- 
bers, the judge tried the case for twelve trial class 
members-three picked by the defendants, three 
by the plaintiff, and six by the court. We tried it 
right through damages-the whole thing. 
Kirkham: You are stating the proposition that the only way 
you can make those cases triable is to adopt an 
"opt in" provision instead of an "opt out" provi- 
sion. Until that is done you are not going to have 
triable cases. 
Salzman: No. The case was tried on the basis of a selected 
number of class members, and we didn't really need 
to know anything about the other class members 
while we were trying the case. 
Kirkham: How do you apply the damages to the others? And 
how many class members did you have? 
Salzman: The purchasers were chosen as class representatives 
by their geographical location. We constructed a 
price-line in each of the areas and had a method of 
20. Harold E. Kohn; Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
21. In re Cast Iron Pipe Antitrust Litigation, No. 71-516 (N.D. Ala.). 
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Kirkham: 
Salzman: 
Kirkham: 
Salzman: 
Kirkham: 
Lundquist: 
comparing a purchase price at a given point to the 
constructed price-line. Then, the jury was asked to 
determine the competitive price in the area at the 
appropriate time and compare it to the price paid 
to arrive at the damage figure. Let's take the Cor- 
rugated Carton case, which is a gigantic, unbeliev- 
able class action. The defendants had information 
relating to the plaintiffs' purchases in their files. 
From this information the jury found an absolute 
minimum amount of damage a class member could 
have suffered. This became the basis for a specific 
damage award. 
How did the jury arrive at the minimum? 
The same way anybody arrives a t  those 
figures-experts get up and jabber and the jury 
makes its decision. 
Have they proved the damage situation with 
respect to each plaintiff? How many plaintiffs were 
involved? 
There are probably 200,000 class members. But it 
doesn't matter what the number is because they 
can each be identified from the defendants' records, 
and the amount of purchases can also be deter- 
mined from those records. 
If you prove damages by sample, you haven't 
proved the damages of any individual persons. 
Although I have not tried any class actions on the 
plaintiffs side to conclusion, I have been involved 
in a number of cases, one with over 40,000 plaintiffs 
and one right now with over 4,000 plaintiffs. We are 
looking at some nationwide cases involving proba- 
bly 50,000 people with individual claims. What 
happens, be they class actions or major product lia- 
bility cases, is that you start to develop guidelines. 
You go through the same exercises after you try a 
few of them. It starts to settle down; you get an- 
swers. I don't see the manageability of large class 
actions as being much of a problem. When we were 
defending class actions ten years ago, we said these 
things were untriable, they couldn't be handled as 
classes, they were unmanageable, nobody was typi- 
cal. I think that position has faded a little bit. 
7411 
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Kirkham: 
Lundquist: . 
Kirkham: 
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What has happened is that people have just 
buckled under, taking samples, using fluid recovery, 
and applying it across the board. 
I have to disagree with you, Francis. Even in the 
fluid recovery cases the problem can be resolved 
once intelligence is brought to bear on it, if there 
are paradigm or model cases. That is what lawyers 
have always done, even outside the class action 
context. They didn't try every automobile accident 
case in which someone had a whiplash. A certain 
model of whiplash cases developed and then most 
settled. If you have a class action embracing 50,000 
plaintiffs, you don't try 50,000 cases; you try ten or 
fifty, enough to develop a model, then most settle. 
Perhaps you have a few strays when the parties 
can't agree that they fit a model; so you have to do 
something with them. 
The British have built so much precedent into their 
damage awards that it has been recently suggested 
that the judges ought to freshen up their preceden- 
tial thinking by trying a few simple jury cases. 
I think this problem could be dismissed much too 
quickly because in large antitrust cases and large 
class actions, the cases are not tried. Even if a test 
case is brought, the verdict in the test case is res 
judicata against a defendant, but the plaintiff must 
still prove his damages. When you aggregate the li- 
ability and damage issues together, not all issues 
are tried. We simply aggregate enormous sums. 
These cases should not be brought to court: there 
should not be a class action of this type. 
Congress determines whether that class action is 
tried or not tried, in the sense of being brought to 
court. All we can do in this discussion is say, "As- 
suming Congress has decided that this is a matter 
of litigation, how is it handled?" 
I disagree because some judges will certify classes 
in cases of that kind and other judges will not. 
You can always ask the appellate judge whether the 
judge who certified the class was right in the first 
instance. 
Should we not address, then, the question of what 
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type of cases should be in the courts? 
Lundquist I don't see how we, as practitioners, offer solutions 
to such inquiries. I haven't thought a lot about 
whether substantively one type of case should or 
should not be in the courts. Certainly the notion 
that some kinds of cases should not be brought into 
courts eliminates problems. However, we may be 
building a different process-something I'm very 
much against. 
Rubin: Let's move to a different topic. We have said that 
the judge has his own problems. Speaking in a vein 
that some of my colleagues will not approve of, I 
say it is up to the judge to solve those problems; 
they are not insoluble in our present system. As 
some of you have pointed out, these complex cases 
seldom arise in one- or two-judge districts. They 
arise in metropolitan districts, and there are very 
few metropolitan districts that are seriously under- 
staffed. I don't mean judges are sitting idle; there is 
plenty of work, but the districts are not seriously 
undermanned the way they were ten years ago. The 
problem, then, is not too few judges. I think that a 
greater initiative and incentive to resolve these 
problems can be found and that, when found, the 
problem will become soluble. 
If a judge gets a complex case that he or she 
knows will take six months to try, the answer is not 
to say, "I can't try this because I have a lot of crim- 
inal trials." It is for the chief judge of that district 
to say, "We will reallot your criminal cases and 
meet the Speedy Trial Act." Another alternative is 
to get visiting judges. Hitherto, one of the practices 
of the judicial profession has been to get the visit- 
ing judge to try the big case; but that's disastrous; 
the visiting judge should come in and handle the 
relatively routine cases to free the local judge for 
ninety days or six months. We need to educate 
judges about judicial administration. Perhaps we 
also need greater tolerance, both among the judici- 
ary and the bar, for the transfer of cases to other 
judges when there are emergencies. As you all 
know, forum shopping is undesirable. Judge shop- 
Lundquist: 
Rubin: 
Lundquist: 
Kirkham: 
Salzman: 
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ping is undesirable. If a lawyer has a personal in- 
jury case of three days to try before judge X, or a 
criminal case set for trial before judge X, and judge 
X happens to be very sympathetic to civil plaintiffs 
and very kind to criminal defendants, the attorney 
does not want that case reassigned to someone else 
just so judge X can try an antitrust case. Therefore, 
the bar resists that device. 
How do you feel about giving each attorney one 
peremptory challenge against a federal judge. 
I've discussed that idea with various people, and I 
have no personal objection to it. But I am told that 
in those jurisdictions that have tried it, it has not 
proven to be a very useful device. 
We have it in our state courts in California, and I 
think it works well. Although it is seldom used, it is 
usually used for good and valid reasons. 
I think the bar would really like a peremptory chal- 
lenge to one judge. But it's very hard to answer the 
point that Judge McCree" raised when I suggested 
this idea. He wondered what would have happened 
down south with a peremptory challenge to Judge 
Johns~n.~' And he makes a very good point. But he 
was describing a situation which should not exist in 
the federal judiciary, one which hopefully no longer 
exists now that certain passions and prejudices 
have been tempered down a little. I think one per- 
emptory challenge to a judge is a fair thing. Inci- 
dentally, if a case is going to be tried by the judge 
rather than the jury, the question of a peremptory 
challenge becomes more important. 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has 
taken a slightly different tack with some of the se- 
nior judges. That circuit has said that if a case re- 
quires more than X number of trial hours, certain 
judges may not handle it. That has shifted the case 
load somewhat. There is also a specific rule in the 
Seventh Circuit that if, after an appeal on the sub- 
22. Wade H. McCree, Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, Chicago, 
Illinois; Former Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 
23. Frank M. Johnson, Jr., Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit, Montgomery, Alabama. 
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stance, a case is remanded, it must be remanded to 
a different judge; it may not go to the same judge. 
I would like to move to the question of jury tri- 
als in complex litigation. Our office has had experi- 
ence with both cases tried by judges and cases tried 
by juries. In one recent case the parties waived the 
jury at the last moment and the case went to the 
judge. In that case, it worked. The judge took as 
active a hand in forcing the simplification of the is- 
sues as if there had been a jury, and the trial en- 
ded. But I've heard many reports of cases tried to 
the court in which the judge took the usual pos- 
ture-he's the judge, he'll sort it out afterwards. 
That posture results in an overly long trial and a 
messy record. It invites disaster that is not likely to 
occur with a jury trial. 
Kirkham: I think we have two points to focus on. One is the 
desirability of trying a complex case before a judge 
or a jury. That would include questions of expedit- 
ing, questions which cut in favor of jury trials. A 
jury trial certainly can be quickly expedited and 
decided. The other point is, what are the constitu- 
tional limitations? As far as the second point is 
concerned, it is important to bear in mind that 
there are two kinds of complex cases. One is the 
complex case within our scope of discussion for 
which the seventh amendment mandates a jury 
trial. The other is the complex case for which the 
seventh amendment does not require a jury. In my 
opinion, there is a classification of the latter kind. 
The issues are sharply defined in the Ninth Circuit 
decision in the United States Financial case:' and 
in the Third Circuit decision in the Japanese Elec- 
tronic case.'@ I think the Japanese Electronic deci- 
sion is a little too narrow. It was decided on the 
grounds that it would be a denial of due process of 
law to submit the case to the jury, and that when 
there is a denial of due process because of a jury 
24. In re United States Financial Securities Litigation, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980). 
25. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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trial, the seventh amendment does not mandate 
one. 
Rubin: I think we should avoid discussing the seventh 
amendment limitations because that issue is up to 
the Supreme Court. Rather, our focus should be 
two-fold. First, despite a constitutional right to a 
jury trial, can litigants agree that certain cases 
should be tried to a judge rather than a jury? And 
how important is the judge's personality in ob- 
taining such an agreement? Second, what should be 
done to improve nonjury trials? 
Lundquist: I am reluctant to part totally with the seventh 
amendment issue because it seems to me that it is 
coming down the road, and scholarly input is going 
to be important with respect to what the Supreme 
Court ultimately decides. But moving on to your 
first point, I think if there is agreement on whether 
a case should be tried to a jury, that makes it easy. 
Your question of how to try nonjury cases is one 
about which we can talk. However, I wonder if that 
same discussion wouldn't apply to trying a complex 
case to a jury. 
Rubin: An important factor in deciding whether you agree 
to a nonjury trial is the personality of the judge as 
viewed by the litigant. 
Lundquist: That is true. There are some added risks in trial by 
a judge that don't exist in a jury trial. I just tried a 
case that was bifuricated-part to a jury and part 
to a judge. The judge ruled against us as a matter 
of law, and I think he was wrong about that, but he 
took the added precaution of not believing any of 
our witnesses who testified at  trial. Thus, whether 
he was right or wrong about. the law, he didn't have 
anything to worry about. He could not do the same 
thing with the part of the trial tried to the jury, 
and it came out very, very differently. That is a risk 
that goes with a judge's personality. 
Salzman: My training is to insist upon a jury trial unless I 
have some good reason not to. Time-saving is not a 
good reason. Federal jury trials are usually over 
quickly. Even if jury trials took additional time, the 
time invested in post-trial proceedings in order to 
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Lundquist : 
Kirkham: 
Lundquist: 
Kirkham: 
Lundquist: 
Rubin: 
secure a final judgment in nonjury trials tips the 
balance in favor of juries. When we try a case to a 
jury, we're probably getting transcripts daily. We 
are using the transcript for the purpose of cross-ex- 
amination and final argument preparation. We are 
looking for material for an hour and a half presen- 
tation to the jury. However, in a bench trial, the 
lawyer reads the transcript to prepare post-trial 
briefs and to draft findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. 
I think the lawyer's skills are used a little better 
when he's trying a case to a jury. Regardless of the 
subject matter, the lawyer must present the 
case-it must be intelligible; it must be direct; it 
must not be overly long. The case is generally bet- 
ter tried to a jury, both in terms of the lawyer's 
techniques and the use of demonstrative evidence, 
which explains things in the best fashion. I would 
give a higher mark to the lawyer's performance in 
the jury trial than I would in the judge trial. 
Just taking one point, how would you use 
demonstrative evidence more effectively before a 
jury than before a judge? 
Well, when I examine an expert witness, instead of 
just giving the judge something to follow, such as a 
chart, I would have it blown up and developed in a 
more complete manner, possibly even utilizing 
colors. 
Why is that not a good device for a judge? He has a 
hard time too. That same chart could be blown up 
in red and blue colors and so on. With respect to 
understanding expert testimony, why shouldn't you 
help the judge out? And in a complex case, if you 
explain things equally well to a judge and a jury, 
isn't a nonjury trial preferable? Aren't you more 
likely to receive a just result from a judge? 
No, I don't think so. I have faith in the jury. 
It has always amazed me that lawyers don't do 
what Francis suggests-make the case as clear to 
the judge as they do to the jury. Perhaps it stems 
from the assumption that the judge is smarter than 
the jury, an assumption which may not be war- 
Lundquist: 
Kirkham: 
Lundquist: 
Kirkham: 
Lundquist: 
Rubin: 
Salzman: 
Lundquist: 
COMPLEX LITIGATION 785 
ranted. Perhaps lawyers assume the judge will feel 
demeaned if they treat him as if he knows nothing. 
I hear 140 cases a year on the court of appeals, and 
in only one or two of them will a lawyer present 
demonstrative evidence. 
I do use demonstrative evidence before the 
appellate courts. However, there is another factor 
to consider in deciding whether to try a case to the 
judge or the jury. I have had judges say, "Enough! I 
don't want to have to hear more of this recording or 
look at more of this video. I have had enough, and 
the rest of it is going to be repetitive." 
If you're giving the same stuff to a jury, you can be 
darn sure that they will say the same thing men- 
tally long before the judge does orally. 
I don't think that is always the case. 
The jurors can always lean back and close their 
minds. 
There is no question about that, but I think the 
judge will form his ideas more quickly and cut off 
the presentation sooner. 
Let me ask another question. The common folklore 
of the profession, perhaps not among trained liti- 
gator~ but certainly in law schools and among out- 
siders, and perhaps even among judges, is that jury 
trials take more time than bench trials. Correct or 
incorrect? 
I think jury trials take far less time when you 
consider the post-hearing work that is required by 
a bench trial. 
Most judges want to see the jury fully occupied so 
they make rulings in advance, decide on exhibits in 
advance, and eliminate bench conferences. Indeed, 
the other day Bob Hanleya6 said that in the MCI- 
ATT casea7 they had but two bench conferences 
during the entire trial. I t  went very smoothly. Be- 
cause a judge has this attitude, I think a jury trial 
may be more efficient than a bench trial. 
26. Robert F. Hanley; Jenner & Block, Chicago, Illinois. 
27. MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 462 F. Supp. 1072 
(N.D. Ill. 1978). 
786 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I981 
Rubin: 
Lundquist: 
Kirkham: 
Lundquistr 
Kirkham: 
Rubin: 
Lundquist: 
Well, lest you think I disagree with you, my own 
reaction is precisely the same. I have found that, if 
you take elapsed time, the time from when the 
bailiff or the deputy clerk calls court to order to the 
time a final decision is rendered, less time is con- 
sumed in a jury trial than there would be in a 
bench trial of the same case. Lawyers do not abbre- 
viate much in a bench trial. In a jury trial the law- 
yer will say, "Well, I'll leave that question out be- 
cause it will bore the jury." But if it is a nonjury 
trial, they don't worry about boring the judge. 
Another problem in a nonjury trial is that the judge 
will say, "I'll let that stuff in but if it's irrelevant, I 
won't consider it." There is a little more latitude in 
such matters during a bench trial than there is in a 
jury trial. 
But, this all applies only when the case can fairly 
be tried to a jury. 
When you say you can't try cases to juries, you are 
saying there are unintelligible laws. 
Oh, my goodness, how many cases are not tried to a 
jury? Maritime cases, admiralty cases, condemna- 
tion cases-there are twenty kinds of cases that 
aren't tried to juries. 
Fifty percent of the trials in federal courts are not 
tried to juries. 
I am speaking in terms of fundamental rights, in 
terms of seventh amendment rights. I believe that 
in all those categories of cases arising at common 
law for which we've had a right to jury trial-and I 
admit there are some aberrational types of cases in 
which the right did not exist at common law, but 
for which the right exists now-we do and should 
have a right to jury trial. It's idle to say that what 
was the common law of that era is the common law 
of today. It has evolved. I can't accept the notion 
that cases are too complex, that one is denied due 
process because a case is too complex. One of the 
remarkable things in this is that you are obviously 
talking about factual complexity, and I don't see 
how the judge rises to the level where he is better 
able to deal with factual complexity. What you are 
Rubin: 
Lundquist: 
Kirkham: 
Rubin: 
Lundquist: 
Rubin: 
Kirkham: 
Salzman: 
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really saying is that the judge has superior intelli- 
gence, and that he can learn more about a technical 
field than jurors can. I think that is a type of elit- 
ism which is not properly founded. 
Do you think the notion is untrue or that it should 
not be acted on as true? 
I think it's untrue in one respect. 
I hear you, but I can't believe it. 
Weyman, I really don't believe that under any of 
the methods we use to measure intelligence you can 
say that the judge, or even the average member of 
the bar, does not have a higher level of intelligence 
than the average juror and does not have a higher 
degree of skill in dealing with controverted facts, 
listening to testimony, and so forth. Now, there 
may be some very good policy reasons why we don't 
want to use people of a higher degree of intelli- 
gence, but that is a different concern. 
I'll accept that, but what I'm saying is that when a 
factual matter comes before a jury there are six or 
preferably twelve people who bring a composite of 
intelligence and experience to bear on the matter. 
That composite of intelligence and learning which 
comes from the jury-and I probably used the 
wrong words in confining it to "intelligence9'-is to- 
tally desirable when dealing with complex issues. 
Do you prefer as a policy matter, and perhaps as a 
constitutional matter, the pooled judgment of six 
typical people over that of one person who might 
have superior background, training, or intellect? 
That seems like a perfectly good value judgment. 
That is a good value judgment in those cases in 
which both groups have the capacity to understand 
and decide the issues on the merits. 
I don't think you can safely assume that a judge 
has a greater capacity to make a fair decision than 
a jury does. I am convinced that in most cases the 
judge's background and experience cause him to be 
predisposed toward a particular view. If you are on 
the losing side to start with, you are not going to be 
able to convince him during the trial. There is a 
much better chance of convincing a jury of what is 
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right. 
Rubin: How do you respond to the type of interview that I 
have seen published in the New York Times and 
the Wall Street Journal. They interview all the ju- 
rors who serve on a celebrated complex case, and 
every one of them says, "I didn't understand it. I 
wish I had not been chosen to decide it." 
Lundquist: I tried two complicated cases to juries this year, one 
involving a lot of chemical processes, engineering 
testimony, building construction issues, and eso- 
teric liability questions. Some products used to 
send rockets to the moon exploded. The jurors 
came out of a southern county and included some 
engineers, some FAA inspectors, a former police of- 
ficer, and a good number of housewives. That jury 
was absolutely as competent to make a determina- 
tion of the numerous factual issues on which they 
heard divergent expert testimony as the judge or 
any of the lawyers were. 
Kirkham: Your statement, "That jury was just as competent 
to decide those issues as the judge," is an opinion, 
and I wonder if it is true. I talked to a little Norwe- 
gian woman that sat on a jury up in Seattle. The 
case involved "split-pump" operations by service 
stations. That is a trade term describing the selling 
of two brands of gasoline at the same service sta- 
tion. She said, "But what I don't know, Mr. Kirk- 
ham, is how you can sell gasoline out of a split 
pump." This, after weeks of trial. 
Lundquist: Those things do happen with juries in bad 
situations. But whenever you interview the jury in 
those situations, you find that the confusion is 
caused by lawyers. Take, for example, some recent 
litigation in Chicago. The litigation was compli- 
cated because it had to do with takeovers and anti- 
trust defenses. The case was dismissed after three 
or four weeks of trial. Someone talked to a juror 
who said, "I was listening for this anti-'rust' de- 
fense and I wondered what was 'rusting'." It is ob- 
vious who was at fault: the lawyers. 
Rubin: The Federal Judicial Center is trying to develop 
some data in districts that have tried complex 
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cases. They will begin by taking a cross-section of 
potential jurors. Next, they will try to get a profile 
of each person, including his education, back- 
ground, occupation, skills, occupational level, and 
so forth. They will then determine how the profile 
of the jury selected in the average noncomplex civil 
case compares to the average person in the jury 
wheel. Finally, they will see how the profile of the 
person selected as a juror in the complex case com- 
pares to the profile of the average juror in the 
wheel. Now, all of us have some suppositions about 
which jurors a lawyer will challenge peremptorily 
and why. We also have suppositions about which 
jurors a judge will excuse for cause and why. We 
have been told, for example, that many professional 
people do not serve on juries in complex cases be- 
cause of the length of the trial. Their schedules 
would be too disrupted, so they are excused for 
cause. Maybe those same people are excused for 
cause in simple cases. Maybe they are challenged 
peremptorily. At any rate, if we are able to find out 
all this data, at least we will know whether we get 
the same kind of juries in complex cases as we get 
in simple cases, and whether either, or both of 
them is much like the cross section of the voting 
population from which most jury panels are drawn. 
Lundquist: I would suggest another area of inquiry, although I 
think I know how it comes out. I would guess that 
if the lawyers who have tried a reasonable or sub- 
stantial number of jury cases were polled, the re- 
sults, on the side of both4 the plaintiff and the de- 
fendant, would show that these lawyers are almost 
uniformly of the view that no case is too complex to 
be tried to a jury. I find that the people who take 
the other point of view have not had a lot of jury 
experience. 
Kirkham: What kind of cases have they tried, Weyman? Take 
the IBM cases, five of which were tried to a jury. 
Three resulted in hung juries, and the other two 
were decided by directed verdict before they went 
to the jury. No jury has come in with a verdict in 
an IBM case yet. Did you talk to those lawyers, and 
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Lundquist: 
Kirkham: 
Lundquist: 
Rubin: 
Lundquist: 
Rubin: 
did they say they preferred a jury trial? 
I could tell you about a substantial number of law- 
yers who, after having tried a number of antitrust 
cases, have a great deal of faith in the jury. In Los 
Angeles, for example, are Joe Ballls and Max 
Blecher,19 who are on opposite sides. They certainly 
have a lot of faith in juries. I could give you other 
examples from all parts of the country. 
Aren't you really talking about cases that all of us 
would concede are triable before juries? 
I raised a different question. I am asking whether 
the lawyers who try jury cases think all cases are 
triable to juries. And I think the answer is yes. 
Those who are opposed to it are lawyers who have 
tried very few jury cases. Indeed, if I had only tried 
one or two jury cases and had been hit for hun- 
dreds of millions of dollars, I would not like juries 
either. 
Weyman, what you say is correct. But I wonder if it 
is not like asking a surgeon about surgery. A mem- 
ber of my family had a lump on the breast, and 
before we had anything done I made some inquiry. 
The best doctor I talked to said, "If the growth is 
malignant, don't go to a surgeon unless you want 
surgery. Go to someone else if you want chemother- 
apy or some other type of treatment. Surgeons be- 
lieve in surgery." Well, lawyers who have tried 
cases before juries believe in juries. Even if they 
have a bad result, they merely say, "The jury went 
wrong, but next time it'll do it right." So I don't 
know whether a general belief is necessarily 
objective. 
The way you have posed the question makes it a 
little tough; whether you should have surgeons in- 
volved in the process of deciding whether to elimi- 
nate surgery totally or just in certain cases is more 
akin to my position. 
Are there other alternatives? Could we have a 
three-judge panel that involved either a judge and 
28. Joseph A. Ball; Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, Long Beach, California. 
29. Maxwell M. Blecher; Blecher, Collins, & Hoecker, Los Angeles, California. 
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Salzman: 
Kirkham: 
Salzman: 
Kirkham: 
Salzman: 
Kirkham: 
Salzman: 
Kirkham: 
Salzman: 
two special masters, or three judges? Would that be 
inferior or superior to a jury, or should that not be 
considered at all? 
I don't see how having three judges is any different 
from having one. You are still presenting the case 
to somebody who has a particular type of training 
and a fairly consistent background. Most judges are 
not too different from one another-they live in the 
same neighborhood, they come in on the same bus. 
Jerry, now that we have recovered from the shock 
of the suggestion, let's put it in context. We are not 
talking about having three judges in cases that can 
be tried to juries; we are talking about using them 
in extraordinary cases like the Japanese Electronic 
case or the United States Financial case. Most rea- 
sonable people, I hope, would think that these cases 
are not triable to a jury. Why in that exceptional 
case shouldn't there be two or three judges? It 
wouldn't be a great burden on the judiciary because 
it would be the exception, the rare case. 
Tell me, which type of case is extraordinary? What 
things would make it necessary for a case to be 
tried before a panel of judges? 
That is a judgment the courts would have to make. 
They are capable of making such decisions. I think 
a reasonable decision can be made as to whether a 
case can be understood by a jury of laymen. Once 
that has been established, as it has been in the 
Third Circuit, then why not use two or three judges 
instead? 
If a case is too complex for a jury to understand, 
the complexity arises out of technical and mechani- 
cal issues, issues the judge is no better equipped to 
understand than the jury is. 
Not necessarily. The case can be very protracted; it 
can involve a multitude of issues. In those situa- 
tions a judge can segment a case; he can have a re- 
cess in the middle. 
He can do that in front of a jury. 
For six months to a year? 
He should be able to break the case down into 
issues that can be dealt with. 
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Lundquist: 
Kirkham: 
Salzman: 
Kirkham: 
Lundquist: 
Kirkham: 
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Rubin: 
I heard a very respected federal district judge ask 
the other day (and I don't know where he comes 
down on this issue): "What makes people think I 
can absorb 100,000 documents or the testimony of 
X number of experts on all kinds of factual issues." 
To let a case get that complex is to overload the 
talents of the most industrious and astute judge. 
A .case that complex cannot be decided by the 
tribunals our civilization supplies. 
The answer to that is contained in the practice 
followed by most good trial lawyers in the Northern 
District of Illinois. They say, "If I can't put this 
case on in three weeks, I am probably going to lose. 
If the defendants want to take six months, good 
luck." 
You cannot put on a case like the United States 
Financial case or the Japanese Electronic case in 
three weeks. There are just too many issues. 
That is a self-fulfilling prophecy. As long as you say 
it is too complex, that there are too many issues, 
one side wins because they obviously want the non- 
jury result and they will string the case out to get 
that result. On the other hand, if, as Judge Rubin 
suggested earlier, both sides are told that in two 
years the case is going to trial, they will focus in 
and decide what really is going to carry the day. 
You are not talking about reality. Examine the 
records in the United States Financial or Japa- 
nese Electronic cases. Read the opinions of the 
judges. See what those cases involved. Then decide 
whether it is possible to try those cases in three 
weeks, if the complexities are being overstated. You 
cannot just dispose of this problem by saying that 
no case is too complex. That is the approach the 
Ninth Circuit took. I think it is overly simplisitic. 
I am familiar with some of the lawyers and judges 
in those cases. I have my views as to what they 
were doing and why. 
Let me ask if we have some ideas about another 
aspect of complex cases. Assuming we have a jury 
trial, are there ways in which the trial process can 
be improved so as to increase jury understanding 
Lundquist: 
Kirkham: 
Lundquist: 
Salzman: 
Rubin: 
Lundquist: 
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and expedite the trial? Some suggestions have been 
made: (1) the judge should give a preliminary 
charge on the law at the start of the trial so the 
jurors will know what to look for; (2) the jury 
should be allowed to take notes; (3) the judge's 
charge should be given to the jury in writing, and 
they should be permitted to take it into the jury 
room. 
Don't forget notebooks for the jury. 
I agree with all of those suggestions. I also advocate 
allowing juries to ask questions during the trial, al- 
ways through the court of course. 
I would not go along with that. 
In the Corrugated case, Judge Singletona0 had a 
booklet prepared, printed, and given to each juror. 
The booklet defined all the terms and identified the 
companies and participants. The jurors had their 
booklet with them at all times, and the plaintiffs 
reinforced that technique by the use of slides. 
Whenever somebody's name was mentioned, a 
paralegal projected a slide identifying the person, 
together with his employment history. 
The device that Jerry suggested can be very useful, 
not only with regard to technical terms, but with 
photographs, exhibits, the preliminary jury charge, 
or other instructions before the jury. It's relatively 
inexpensive to reproduce those documents. 
There was some difference of opinion on 
whether the jury should be permitted to ask ques- 
tions. Why don't we explore that? 
The problem is that the lawyers have in mind what 
they want to do: each side is trying to educate. It is 
like when I give a lecture at  Dartmouth. At times it 
is inappropriate to take questions. Often, one ques- 
tion throws everyone off, and indeed even in the 
open sessions, I find that many students come in 
and say, "That question was off the mark; it didn't 
interest the rest of us." I think it is better to go 
through with what the lawyer has to present and 
not to allow one concern to be overly elevated. Be- 
30. John V. Singleton, Jr., Chief Judge for the Southern District of Texas. 
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Kirkham: 
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Kirkham: 
Rubin: 
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Rubin: 
sides, some people are afraid to ask questions. Fur- 
ther, if in the course of the trial the lawyer makes 
what is kind of a continuum of opening state- 
ment-that is, if when he comes to a different 
phase of the testimony the lawyer explains what is 
going to happen in that phase-many of those ju- 
rors' questions will be answered. 
What do you think of questions by the jury, Judge 
Rubin? 
I have always asked jurors to be very careful about 
asking questions because the lawyers have a certain 
order of trial. I instruct the jurors that if they have 
some question they really think is important, they 
should write it out and hand it to the marshall. 
Therefore, I have had very few questions submitted 
during the course of trial. But I think opinion var- 
ies widely on this matter. Some judges and trial 
lawyers say, "Let the jury ask questions. If it's on 
their minds, we might as well know about it." 
I analogize the situation to an appellate argument. 
Every lawyer likes to stand up and go through that 
remarkable discourse he has prepared. He resents a 
judge's interruption. But believe me, if he doesn't 
take that question and answer it, he is going to lose. 
The worst question that I ever heard propounded 
by a juror was one that was blurted out. One of our 
more celebrated trial attorneys, who thinks he has 
a certain amount of appeal to female jurors, was 
engaged in doing the thing for which he was cele- 
brated. Right in the middle of some histrionic argu- 
ment, one female juror said, "Why don't you sit 
down and shut up?" 
Arguing a case before a jury is not like an appellate 
argument because the lawyer does not always con- 
trol his ability to answer the question. There may 
be witnesses who will testify to issues A, B, and C. 
The first witness may testify to A and C but not B, 
and B may be the issue of interest to the jury at 
that point. 
In cases involving separate issues, we do have a 
great problem with the jury trial. The Supreme 
Court has decided that you may sever issues in a 
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jury trial, but it has never held that you may sub- 
mit a second issue to a different jury. Assuming 
that could be done, would it be a useful device to 
be able to sever issues in a jury trial and assemble a 
different jury for each issue rather than just go 
straight through the whole trial? 
Salzman: It makes a certain amount of sense in some 
situations. For example, it could be used when the 
proof of damages would occupy more than thirty 
percent of the trial time. If the case takes three to 
five weeks to try, and if the proof of damages is go- 
ing to take another three weeks, severance may 
prove useful. I have seen this proposed, but when it 
came close to trial, the attorneys would always say, 
"These issues cannot be separated because the 
facts that pertain to issue one go to issue two, and 
it is only going to take an extra fifteen percent of 
the time. We might as well have the jury decide 
both of them." 
Rubin: Are there any other things we want to say about 
complex cases at the trial level? If not, we might 
try to answer some questions about whether com- 
plex cases offer any particular problems at the ap- 
pellate stage. 
Lundquist: One thing that strikes me about complex cases a t  
the appellate level is the bar's acceptance of the 
firm limitations as to brief length and type of argu- 
ment. I don't have any trouble accepting that. To 
me, the limitations generally make a lot of sense. 
And yet, I am surprised to see how lawyers can ac- 
cept the appellate process as a compressed process 
when they assert that some aspects of trial are so 
difficult that they have to be handled in an open- 
ended time frame. Perhaps people are more accus- 
tomed to having rules at the appellate level than 
they are at the trial stage. 
Rubin: Do you accept the proposition that there is an 
almost one hundred percent appeal rate on com- 
plex cases that go to final judgment? 
Lundquist: I would accept the proposition that notices of 
appeals are filed in almost one hundred percent of 
the cases; I would not accept the proposition that 
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almost one hundred percent of those cases go 
through to an appellate determination. 
Salzman: We have had a couple of small complex cases, that 
is, cases in which not many attorneys were involved 
even though the issues were complex and even 
though they were class actions on behalf of all hold- 
ers of commodities contracts. And in those cases 
which the defendant won by a jury verdict and in 
which the judge had, I think, essentially given the 
plaintiffs their head, the plaintiffs were out of luck 
on an appeal. They were responsible for substantial 
costs and expenses, and they were willing to forego 
the appeal for forgiveness of those costs and ex- 
penses. Those cases never were appealed. 
Lundquist: I see a lot of complex cases settled after 
determination at the trial stage. In other cases, 
there is a lot of maneuvering back and forth 
through the appellate process. But aren't some ap- 
pellate cases now starting out with a kind of settle- 
ment conference? 
Rubin: The Second Circuit has such a procedure. They use 
a commissioner, who is a lawyer of considerable 
experience. 
Salzman: New York state courts also seem to follow such a 
procedure. 
Kirkham: Before we finish, we ought to discuss incentives and 
disincentives to saving time. Then, we should try to 
sum up. 
Salzman: One thing I would like to mention is the notion of 
prejudgment interest in order to discourage stalling 
by certain defendants. The interest should be cal- 
culated at a genuine rate. The only problem with 
that idea is that it presumes there is going to be a 
judgment. And it presumes that any settlement will 
take into account, in addition to actual damages, 
the amount of prejudgment interest that would 
have been earned if there had been a judgment at 
the time. But, I think it would be some incentive to 
avoid unnecessary protraction of cases. 
Lundquist: Another observation which doesn't follow on that, 
but which I have heard a number of times, is that 
trial lawyers tend to approach discovery differently 
Rubin: 
Lundquist: 
Salzman: 
Kirkham: 
Salzman: 
COMPLEX LITIGATION 797 
than what I describe as "litigators," and as a conse- 
quence you tend to get lower costs when a trial law- 
yer is involved. Even in the personal injury defense 
bar some lawyers who represent insurance compa- 
nies have not tried a case in years. I would classify 
such lawyers as litigators. Litigators go on a much 
more elaborate discovery route. I don't know that 
the results are different. But that approach is start- 
ing to emerge. Until now we have thought of the 
trial and litigation bars as one and the same. I have 
some question as to whether they are. 
Let me ask a different question. In large part I 
think we agree that a good deal can be done to alle- 
viate problems of complex litigation by having a 
certain type of judge who has a certain type of in- 
terest and incentive and, I presume, a certain type 
of background and skill. Are we getting trial judges 
who are capable of carrying out this mission? 
That is becoming a problem because of the income 
level of judges, at least where I have prac- 
ticed-Boston, San Francisco, and Alaska. In the 
past, there have been many very fine judges at  both 
the federal and the state court levels, but it is a 
problem now. We are in danger of losing those 
types of people. 
I see it a little differently in the Northern District 
of Illinois. Good people are becoming judges, really 
spectacular people. But I don't think those people 
view it as a lifetime career the way it was formerly 
viewed. I think it is seen as a five- or seven-year 
career stop that is going to enhance your value as 
an attorney when you are done. You make certain 
short-term financial sacrifices for which you are 
awarded certain long-term financial benefits. 
You have answered the question in the negative 
then, haven't you? There is a threat to a competent 
federal judiciary. 
No. The question is, is it like the army, where the 
first four years are training and the next twenty 
years are productive? Are we getting enough years 
out of these people who serve only seven to nine 
years? My guess is that we are. Maybe it is not so 
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Rubin: 
Lundquist: 
Rubin: 
Kirkham: 
Salzman: 
Kirkham: 
Lundquis t: 
Rubin: 
bad to have a rotation like that on the federal 
bench. 
I don't think the problem is exclusively a federal 
one because, as we all know, approximately ninety 
percent of all the cases tried in this country are 
tried in state courts. 
But, I would disagree with Jerry. I would like to see 
the bench become the pinnacle that one could 
achieve professionally. It should not be a way stop 
to a greater economic career. If that is the motiva- 
tion people have for becoming judges, we are in a 
little danger already. I don't feel judges should be 
the highest paid segment of the profession, but 
they certainly should be paid enough so that when 
that pay is added to the other emoluments and re- 
sponsibilities that go with the job, it attracts good 
people to the pinnacle. 
Perhaps pay is not the sole criterion. There may be 
other things about the nature of the judicial role 
that tend, quite apart from direct compensation, to 
be attractive or unattractive to successful 
practitioners. 
That is true, but they should not be penalized for 
letting that high quality of devotion direct their 
path. 
Think of the difference between the urban districts 
and the rural districts. In North Dakota $54,000 is 
not an inconsiderable sum compared to what other 
practitioners in the area make, but in New York 
City you can't afford to ride the subway on that 
salary. 
Don't overlook the fact that the per diem a judge 
receives when he goes to another area does not even 
pay his hotel room. 
That has always been a problem. When the federal 
judiciary was well compensated, the North Dakota 
judges were extremely well compensated. 
Some of you gentlemen are being a little provincial 
about what lawyers in small towns are able to make 
now. When I say small towns I don't mean a town 
of 10,000, but communities of 300,000 and 400,000. 
I know by what people tell me what starting law- 
COMPLEX LITIGATION 799 
yers and successful practitioners make in towns of 
that size. 
Kirkham: If it is agreeable to the rest of you, perhaps we 
could each take a moment to sum up our views. I'll 
begin. 
In summary, I would like to return to the point 
I made earlier. One of the real problems with our 
courts today is that we have cases in the courts that 
should not be there. As far as the complex case is 
concerned, there should not be a rule 23(b)(3) class 
action available with an opt-out provision. An opt- 
out provision creates untriable cases that are re- 
solved only by settlement. Often these settlements 
are extorted and unfair. Our system simply does 
not furnish a forum for the just resolution of those 
cases. If you took rule 23(b)(3) cases out, or con- 
verted it to an opt-in rule, then a very large per- 
centage of complex litigation problems would be 
eliminated. 
A related problem is the filing of suits for 
which the attorney and the client have no real ba- 
sis. Because they hear some rumor that the United 
States is investigating some company, they immedi- 
ately jump in and file a lawsuit. It has been sug- 
gested here that perhaps a lawyer has an obligation 
to do that because the statute of limitations is run- 
ning. I disagree. Courts are formed for the purpose 
of trying law suits; and if a person doesn't have a 
law suit, doesn't know what the issues are, and 
doesn't know how his client is hurt and by whom, 
then he ought not to file the suit. The lawyer ought 
not to file pleadings, untruthfully certify under rule 
11 that they are filed in good faith, and then resort 
to discovery to try to find a cause of action. 
I also very strongly believe that there are cer- 
tain types of complex litigation that should not be 
tried by juries and cannot be tried by juries in ac- 
cordance with due process of law. Beyond that I 
think the single most important thing we have said 
today is that to solve the problem of complex litiga- 
tion, we need a strong judge who will immediately 
take charge of the case, frame the issues, and con- 
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fine discovery to the issues. The judge should set 
target dates and determine as soon as reasonably 
possible whether the trial will be to a jury. A good 
strong judge will make a real difference. 
Lundquist: I guess I have summarized throughout, but I cannot 
say that I am really one hundred percent, or even 
much more than seventy-five percent, with Francis. 
However, let me say that I think the problems are 
probably more internal. Many lawyers abuse the 
system. This has come to bother courts, clients, and 
the public. I think lawyers have to look very hard 
at their responsibilities. Indeed, what the ABA Spe- 
cial Committee on Discovery Abuse is pushing for 
is to have lawyers certify at every step of the way 
that things are done in good faith. This is necessary 
because lawyers do practice in a conflict situation. 
Maurice Rosenburg31 and others have observed that 
discovery and the coincidence of big firms starting 
to charge hourly fees for everybody, including 
paralegals, have put an unnatural strain on the con- 
flict position of lawyers. So I think the profession 
has to, and I think it is starting to, do some things 
in that respect. With that attention from the pro- 
fession and with an involved judiciary, we have the 
ability to solve most of the problems in the next 
decade, not in a perfect way, but in enough of a 
way so that people continue to respect the system. 
I don't like the idea of eliminating cases from 
our court systems. I think one of the geniuses of the 
American judicial system, both federal and state, is 
that it operates as sort of a social roller-bearing in 
which people are able to litigate their disputes. I t  
has been an enormous outlet for people. Lawyers 
should not care about not being liked as long as the 
system is working. And I think it has worked in this 
country in an exemplary fashion. While it needs re- 
form, that reform should be along the lines we have 
talked about: quick trials, strong judicial adminis- 
tration, and lawyers who exercise their judgment so 
31. Maurice Rosenberg, Harold R. Medina Professor of Procedural Jurisprudence, 
Columbia University, New York, New York. 
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that they are not conducting abusive, redundant 
discovery. 
Salzman: I think the possibility of eliminating the problems 
of complex cases through self-policing is slight. We 
might make some headway with prejudgment inter- 
est. Also, some progress may be made by disciplin- 
ing attorneys or their clients for inordinate delays, 
improper objections, and bad-faith stalling tactics. 
I agree that we have to look for an active hand 
from judges, but this does not mean that we need a 
lot of status reports and a lot of hearings. Such pro- 
cedures do not encourage the winding up of a case, 
but often breed greater complexity. When lawyers 
know the judge is willing to listen, rather than sup- 
ply direction, they can turn a slip-and-fall case into 
a complex one. 
I do not agree that rule 23(b)(3) creates corn- 
plex litigation. However, I do not believe in rule 23 
cases anymore. Our firm would be happy to do 
them if we were the only firm involved, but we 
don't want to occupy our time with gigantic corn- 
mittees of plaintiffs. My personal experience is that 
the recent cases, many of which have been settled, 
are not blackmail cases. If anything, the total 
amount achieved in settlement is substantially less 
than the amounts that would have been achieved 
had many of the large class members filed and pur- 
sued their own litigation. The judicial costs would 
have been greater, there would have been many 
more cases filed, and the cases would have been 
more complicated. 
With respect to rule 11 and its place in simpli- 
fying litigation, I am going to go along with Francis 
and say that I believe rule 11 could be enforced 
more sternly. A judge should say, "I am going to 
give you a month, but this motion is pending. If 
you don't have something by the end of the month, 
you are going out the window on a rule 11 motion." 
However, I don't believe there are that many law 
suits that would be subject to a rule 11 motion. 
Most law suits that are subject to rule 11 motions 
have been brought for political purposes by individ- 
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uals who had to protect certain types of interests 
for the groups of people they were representing. 
Perhaps there are some complex cases that 
cannot be tried to a jury, but I have not seen them. 
Francis has mentioned some, and he sounds as if he 
is right, but such cases don't often come across my 
desk. I believe that the jury is very useful and that 
if a litigator thinks he has to try his case before a 
jury, he begins to think earlier about which wit- 
nesses he can actually use. Some think that forcing 
a lawyer to do this is not fair. I think however, that 
such choices are part of life in these United States, 
and it is not a bad system. 
Rubin: Yesterday, I finished fourteen years on the bench, 
of which twelve were rather busy trial court years. I 
have seen a relatively small number of cases filed 
that a conscientious, honorable advocate would not 
file. I believe I have seen at least an equally small 
number of cases defended that an honorable, con- 
scientious advocate would not defend, or at least 
not in the way the cases were defended. I don't be- 
lieve that any major part of the problems faced by 
courts in this country is caused by lawyers institut- 
ing or defending litigation that should not be insti- 
tuted or defended. We do have a problem in that 
area, however, and we are all aware of it. It is a 
problem with which the new ABA Commission on 
Professional Responsibility has dealt. Should the 
lawyer's duty to his client be the major or, indeed, 
the sole controlling rule of behavior, or does the ad- 
vocate owe other duties to society? By and large we 
are very timorous about doing anything that sup- 
plants the paramount duty to the client. Therefore, 
I don't think we are likely, either as a self-policing 
matter or as a judicial matter, to do much about 
enforcing rule 11 sanctions through the dismissal of 
law suits or defenses. 
It seems to me that in complex cases what we 
have is, to use exactly the same term, a complex 
problem. The problem is brought about by a host 
of causes, some of which are societal in nature: 
What does society look to the courts to decide? 
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Some are caused by the judge's role in litigation. 
Others are brought about by the development of 
what has accurately been called the "litigation in- 
dustry." These problems are not capable of simple 
solution. We are not going to solve them by limiting 
the number of interrogatories or by several changes 
in the federal rules. The solution will be found by 
trying to deal with many of the things that contrib- 
ute, by their interaction and by their dynamics, to 
the problem. 
One thing I think we have all agreed on is that 
a complex case is a slightly different species of liti- 
gation than the typical case. It deserves a different 
track, a different kind of treatment. It requires a 
different kind of attitude by all of those concerned. 
We have a system in which, laudably, judges are 
chosen from the profession. They are familiar with 
the problems of the profession, but they also bring 
with them the limitations of the profession. They 
bring with them attitudes and perceptions that are 
typical of the profession. So part of the problem in 
dealing with the judge's perception of his role is 
dealing with the profession's perception of that 
role. This I think requires acceptance of the notion 
that the complex case requires special management: 
it must be tailor-made management; it has to em- 
ploy some accepted devices that might be uniform, 
but each case has to be taken individually; and the 
lawyers have to accept and tolerate a degree of ju- 
dicial intervention that perhaps would be unaccept- 
able in other cases. This also requires that the bar 
take a different role in these cases. In addition to 
accepting judicial management, lawyers must have 
some understanding of the nature of the problem. 
They must understand that the escalation of litiga- 
tion costs is a matter of public concern even if both 
parties are willing to expend unlimited amounts. 
Litigation cost is public business. It reflects on our 
system for controversy disposition. I think we need 
broad, massive professional reeducation. We need 
to reeducate judges and magistrates, both state and 
federal, and people actively engaged in litigation. 
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Finally, I think we need some incentive for 
quality performance in the judicial role. All of the 
measures now taken to evaluate judicial perform- 
ance are objective and statistical: How fast do the 
cases come to trial? How many cases did the judge 
dispose of? and so forth. We have no method by 
which we can measure good judging and bad judg- 
ing, or quality performance versus nonquality per- 
formance. Like everyone else in our society, judges 
respond to incentives. Those incentives must not be 
monetary, but I think we ought to give some pro- 
fessional attention to devising ways to measure 
quality and to encourage quality. 
